By Samantha
In Public Policy Agenda Setting, Mammotsa Makhene asks us to identify which model best describes current policy setting agenda in the United States (US), who gets to set this agenda and what mechanisms do they use (94-5)? In response, this piece will focus on Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) a model that focuses on policy windows, opportunities when governments are able to advance ambitious reform agendas. The piece looks at the current Presidential race between the Democratic candidate, Hillary Clinton and her Republican opponent, Donald Trump, and argues that neither will be able to advance a major reform agenda once elected, as the necessary conditions will not be in place to open a policy window.
Policy windows were first identified by John Kingdon (1984) who developed an analytic framework for agenda setting, in which three sets of variables -streams of problems, policies and politics – were identified. Within problem streams are issues perceived as requiring government attention. These problems are addressed within the policy stream by experts, who analyze problems and propose solutions. The political stream is composed of factors such as administrative and legislative turn-over, national mood and interest group campaigns. During policy windows, these three come together, and can be seized upon by political players to set the policy agenda. Kingdon noted that policy windows can be opened randomly, due to external events or crises, as well as during routinized political windows, such as elections or budget cycles. (Howell, Ramesh & Perl, 2009)
Outside of policy windows, change is generally slow and incremental, due to the constraints on policy makers’ time, resources and capacity to alter existing arrangements (referred to as bounded rationality). In his 1993 study on reform governments, John Keeler noted, “a burst of successful policy-making is possible only when various constraints that normally frustrate a government give way, opening a ‘policy window’ or opportunity for action on public policy initiatives.”[i] Keeler focused on two variables, working alone or in combination, that open policy windows: political developments and social problems. Using regression analysis and case studies of the legislative achievements of postwar governments in Great Britain, France and the US, he argued that window size is determined by the size of the mandate that the government enjoys and the severity of the problems (crisis)present during the election and initial months in office. Dramatic electoral outcomes provide a mandate or authorization by the public to take action, which even opposition parties may feel compelled to adhere to. This is often accompanied by legislative empowerment, or the necessary majority needed to pass reforms, along with pressure from party activists to fulfill government’s commitments. The second variable, crises, can range from large scale public dissatisfaction, to social unrest and threats to national security. [ii]
Looking at the current US presidential election, there is large-scale public dissatisfaction with the current economic status quo, which has seen declining income and well-being for the middle-class. Illegal migration along with racial tensions over policing and crime are contributing to a social unrest, both real and perceived. And the continued spate of ISIS-inspired terrorist attacks, in the US and Europe, is contributing to a sense of insecurity. While the crisis variable is in place, it is unclear if either Clinton or Trump will be able to establish a sufficient mandate to pass sweeping reforms. While Clinton is still projected to win, the race is looking close, and she does not enjoy broad support even among Democratic voters. There are hopes that Democratic Party could regain the majority in the Senate, but the odds are looking increasingly slim, and it is more likely she would still face a Republican legislative majority.[iii] . Meanwhile, Trump has sorely divided Republicans and would also face entrenched opposition from Democrats, as well as constitutional, financial and legal barriers to some of his proposed actions. As theorized by Keeler, Trump would have a hollow mandate, in which crisis generates mandate and expectations, but does not deliver sufficient power to carry out promised reforms. [iv]
Another reason to expect that Trump or Clinton would be unable to undertake large-scale reform emerges from later literature on PET, which highlights the role of policy monopoly, in which ideas, actors and institutions are locked into a policy frame. (Howell, Ramesh & Perl, 2009) These periods of equilibrium or stasis occur when an issue is ‘captured by a policy subsystem’. [v]The market-oriented frame, which has had a monopoly in the US policy at the macro-level since the early 1980s, has been contested strongly from the left by Democratic primary candidate Bernie Sanders, but less overtly by Clinton, who remains welded to a centrist stance, and keeps promises in-line with an incremental approach. Meanwhile Trump’s policies on free-markets are forcing the issue back on the ‘macro-political agenda’ using populist political images. It has already dealt a serious blow to the Republican mainstream, opening up their policy monopoly beyond the control of specialists[vi]. But it is unclear if any coherent sets of policies or new solutions are emerging that are ready to compete. (Howell, Ramesh & Perl, 2009) The Republican policy stream will want to maintain their control and influence, and will attempt to accommodate populism, but will likely struggle to deliver a coherent series of policy reforms that meet the demands of Trumps supporters while maintaining global, free-market conservatism of the past 30 years.
In conclusion, PET indicates that some of the conditions for punctuation in the equilibrium have been met; there is widespread public dissatisfaction with the status quo and a puncturing of the Republican free-market policy monopoly from within the political right, bringing in new, powerful images. However, it is not clear that these images are enough to create policies that will spread across the multiple venues of decision-making in the US government, and or overcome the negative feedback they will engender from both sides of the political aisle. What is more likely to ensue is the policy norm: slow change and limits on the presidency to reset the agenda. (Howell, Ramesh & Perl, 2009)
[i] Keeler, John S., Opening the Window for Reform: Mandates, Crises and Extraordinary Policy-Making, Comparative Political Studies, 25(4) (1993): 433-486
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] Steinhauer, Jennifer, Democrats’ Weak Bench Undermines Hopes of Taking Back the Senate, The New York Times, August 25, 2016
[iv] Keeler, John S.
[v] Baumgartner, Frank, R., Jones, Bryan D., and Mortensen, Peter B. Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: Explaining Stability and Change in Public Policymaking, in Theories of the Policy Process, Sabatier and Weible Eds. (2014) Westview Press
[vi] Ibid.
In Public Policy Agenda Setting, Mammotsa Makhene asks us to identify which model best describes current policy setting agenda in the United States (US), who gets to set this agenda and what mechanisms do they use (94-5)? In response, this piece will focus on Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) a model that focuses on policy windows, opportunities when governments are able to advance ambitious reform agendas. The piece looks at the current Presidential race between the Democratic candidate, Hillary Clinton and her Republican opponent, Donald Trump, and argues that neither will be able to advance a major reform agenda once elected, as the necessary conditions will not be in place to open a policy window.
Policy windows were first identified by John Kingdon (1984) who developed an analytic framework for agenda setting, in which three sets of variables -streams of problems, policies and politics – were identified. Within problem streams are issues perceived as requiring government attention. These problems are addressed within the policy stream by experts, who analyze problems and propose solutions. The political stream is composed of factors such as administrative and legislative turn-over, national mood and interest group campaigns. During policy windows, these three come together, and can be seized upon by political players to set the policy agenda. Kingdon noted that policy windows can be opened randomly, due to external events or crises, as well as during routinized political windows, such as elections or budget cycles. (Howell, Ramesh & Perl, 2009)
Outside of policy windows, change is generally slow and incremental, due to the constraints on policy makers’ time, resources and capacity to alter existing arrangements (referred to as bounded rationality). In his 1993 study on reform governments, John Keeler noted, “a burst of successful policy-making is possible only when various constraints that normally frustrate a government give way, opening a ‘policy window’ or opportunity for action on public policy initiatives.”[i] Keeler focused on two variables, working alone or in combination, that open policy windows: political developments and social problems. Using regression analysis and case studies of the legislative achievements of postwar governments in Great Britain, France and the US, he argued that window size is determined by the size of the mandate that the government enjoys and the severity of the problems (crisis)present during the election and initial months in office. Dramatic electoral outcomes provide a mandate or authorization by the public to take action, which even opposition parties may feel compelled to adhere to. This is often accompanied by legislative empowerment, or the necessary majority needed to pass reforms, along with pressure from party activists to fulfill government’s commitments. The second variable, crises, can range from large scale public dissatisfaction, to social unrest and threats to national security. [ii]
Looking at the current US presidential election, there is large-scale public dissatisfaction with the current economic status quo, which has seen declining income and well-being for the middle-class. Illegal migration along with racial tensions over policing and crime are contributing to a social unrest, both real and perceived. And the continued spate of ISIS-inspired terrorist attacks, in the US and Europe, is contributing to a sense of insecurity. While the crisis variable is in place, it is unclear if either Clinton or Trump will be able to establish a sufficient mandate to pass sweeping reforms. While Clinton is still projected to win, the race is looking close, and she does not enjoy broad support even among Democratic voters. There are hopes that Democratic Party could regain the majority in the Senate, but the odds are looking increasingly slim, and it is more likely she would still face a Republican legislative majority.[iii] . Meanwhile, Trump has sorely divided Republicans and would also face entrenched opposition from Democrats, as well as constitutional, financial and legal barriers to some of his proposed actions. As theorized by Keeler, Trump would have a hollow mandate, in which crisis generates mandate and expectations, but does not deliver sufficient power to carry out promised reforms. [iv]
Another reason to expect that Trump or Clinton would be unable to undertake large-scale reform emerges from later literature on PET, which highlights the role of policy monopoly, in which ideas, actors and institutions are locked into a policy frame. (Howell, Ramesh & Perl, 2009) These periods of equilibrium or stasis occur when an issue is ‘captured by a policy subsystem’. [v]The market-oriented frame, which has had a monopoly in the US policy at the macro-level since the early 1980s, has been contested strongly from the left by Democratic primary candidate Bernie Sanders, but less overtly by Clinton, who remains welded to a centrist stance, and keeps promises in-line with an incremental approach. Meanwhile Trump’s policies on free-markets are forcing the issue back on the ‘macro-political agenda’ using populist political images. It has already dealt a serious blow to the Republican mainstream, opening up their policy monopoly beyond the control of specialists[vi]. But it is unclear if any coherent sets of policies or new solutions are emerging that are ready to compete. (Howell, Ramesh & Perl, 2009) The Republican policy stream will want to maintain their control and influence, and will attempt to accommodate populism, but will likely struggle to deliver a coherent series of policy reforms that meet the demands of Trumps supporters while maintaining global, free-market conservatism of the past 30 years.
In conclusion, PET indicates that some of the conditions for punctuation in the equilibrium have been met; there is widespread public dissatisfaction with the status quo and a puncturing of the Republican free-market policy monopoly from within the political right, bringing in new, powerful images. However, it is not clear that these images are enough to create policies that will spread across the multiple venues of decision-making in the US government, and or overcome the negative feedback they will engender from both sides of the political aisle. What is more likely to ensue is the policy norm: slow change and limits on the presidency to reset the agenda. (Howell, Ramesh & Perl, 2009)
[i] Keeler, John S., Opening the Window for Reform: Mandates, Crises and Extraordinary Policy-Making, Comparative Political Studies, 25(4) (1993): 433-486
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] Steinhauer, Jennifer, Democrats’ Weak Bench Undermines Hopes of Taking Back the Senate, The New York Times, August 25, 2016
[iv] Keeler, John S.
[v] Baumgartner, Frank, R., Jones, Bryan D., and Mortensen, Peter B. Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: Explaining Stability and Change in Public Policymaking, in Theories of the Policy Process, Sabatier and Weible Eds. (2014) Westview Press
[vi] Ibid.