Mammotsa Makhene
In her paper Heaven And Hell - Two Faces of Cities Li highlights that the benefits of urban growth are not evenly distributed. She goes on to say that for those who benefit the most out of this growth, the city may seem like heaven, while those on the short end of the stick may see the city as hell. Magnifying this problem is the existence of what is now termed political development machines. By applying Arnstein’s theory on citizen participation to the London South Bank development project, I will show how the big machine uses its power to gain favourable outcomes.
In their study of London’s South Bank, the firm that was hired to act as an intermediary between the community, government and the developers, undertook many different forms of engaging the public. One thousand residents and businesses were consulted over the span of about six months. The company had various stages of consultation which were basically designed for the community to share their vision and create a master plan for the development that would be incorporated into the plan drawn up by the developers . Soundings, a company that has a great reputation in this space, was presented as a mediator that would bring innovative solutions and ensure proper community participation (231).
Here we can apply what Arnstein terms the manipulation and therapy part of the consultation process. The hiring of Soundings, which is seen as one of the best firms in the field of project development mediation, can be seen as a sort of rubber stamp which signals to public officials and some community members that the developers are invested in actual community participation. Their position as an innovative mediator can have numerous interpretations. The word mediator carries certain connotations about the existence of a problem and having two parties deadlocked and unable to negotiate. The negotiator or mediator is then requested to mediate or “fix” the problem, a kind of therapy if you will.
The study also noted that resistance to the project was not as intense as it had previously been for other projects. While it may be argued that this was due to the community having “over consultation” fatigue, another possible explanation is that of the placation stage of the model. A prominent community group which had previously been at the forefront of development resistance, did not take the same stand here. A representative informed the authors that even though they knew that the development would have some bad impacts, the homes and new jobs it would create were of great importance. This can be viewed almost as a token of sorts, through which the community feels they have a certain level of power as these jobs and homes will belong to them (233).
According to Arnstein, the partnership stage of the process works best when communities have an organized power base that holds leaders accountable and can pay to hire its own experts (221). It would seem that for the South Bank project, the placation of strong community groups undermines this sentiment.
The consultation part of the process, took many forms as already mentioned. Part of this according to Arnstein is those with power having evidence that they went through the process of engaging and involving the community. Respondents from the South Bank Project felt that they could not always identify who the developers were. It was felt that the local government was taking a back seat and not actively engaging with the community. Thus the surveys and interviews conducted by Sounds were more of a evidence collecting initiative than a consultative one ( Raco, Street and Freire- Trigo, 234). Finally, citizen control and power delegation can be observed in evidence that showed that the developer did make some changes to accommodate the community’s feedback.
While Arnstein’s theory is not without its shortcomings, it provides us with a good basic framework to help us understand the workings of big political development machines. These machines with extensive resources and power are at the forefront of urban development today.
In her paper Heaven And Hell - Two Faces of Cities Li highlights that the benefits of urban growth are not evenly distributed. She goes on to say that for those who benefit the most out of this growth, the city may seem like heaven, while those on the short end of the stick may see the city as hell. Magnifying this problem is the existence of what is now termed political development machines. By applying Arnstein’s theory on citizen participation to the London South Bank development project, I will show how the big machine uses its power to gain favourable outcomes.
In their study of London’s South Bank, the firm that was hired to act as an intermediary between the community, government and the developers, undertook many different forms of engaging the public. One thousand residents and businesses were consulted over the span of about six months. The company had various stages of consultation which were basically designed for the community to share their vision and create a master plan for the development that would be incorporated into the plan drawn up by the developers . Soundings, a company that has a great reputation in this space, was presented as a mediator that would bring innovative solutions and ensure proper community participation (231).
Here we can apply what Arnstein terms the manipulation and therapy part of the consultation process. The hiring of Soundings, which is seen as one of the best firms in the field of project development mediation, can be seen as a sort of rubber stamp which signals to public officials and some community members that the developers are invested in actual community participation. Their position as an innovative mediator can have numerous interpretations. The word mediator carries certain connotations about the existence of a problem and having two parties deadlocked and unable to negotiate. The negotiator or mediator is then requested to mediate or “fix” the problem, a kind of therapy if you will.
The study also noted that resistance to the project was not as intense as it had previously been for other projects. While it may be argued that this was due to the community having “over consultation” fatigue, another possible explanation is that of the placation stage of the model. A prominent community group which had previously been at the forefront of development resistance, did not take the same stand here. A representative informed the authors that even though they knew that the development would have some bad impacts, the homes and new jobs it would create were of great importance. This can be viewed almost as a token of sorts, through which the community feels they have a certain level of power as these jobs and homes will belong to them (233).
According to Arnstein, the partnership stage of the process works best when communities have an organized power base that holds leaders accountable and can pay to hire its own experts (221). It would seem that for the South Bank project, the placation of strong community groups undermines this sentiment.
The consultation part of the process, took many forms as already mentioned. Part of this according to Arnstein is those with power having evidence that they went through the process of engaging and involving the community. Respondents from the South Bank Project felt that they could not always identify who the developers were. It was felt that the local government was taking a back seat and not actively engaging with the community. Thus the surveys and interviews conducted by Sounds were more of a evidence collecting initiative than a consultative one ( Raco, Street and Freire- Trigo, 234). Finally, citizen control and power delegation can be observed in evidence that showed that the developer did make some changes to accommodate the community’s feedback.
While Arnstein’s theory is not without its shortcomings, it provides us with a good basic framework to help us understand the workings of big political development machines. These machines with extensive resources and power are at the forefront of urban development today.