By David López García
PhD Student of Public and Urban Policy
The New School
In his précis, José Galvez makes the argument that public participation is a crucial element in successful policy making. It also questions if our system is strong enough to involve the public in an active manner or if it begs for re-visiting. I will claim the latter. To build my argument, I will argue that advocating for more participation without engaging in a normative discussion questioning the system as it exist today, is likely to result in the reproduction of any society’s structural inequality.
The case for supporting public participation appears to be based on the arguments raised by Stiglitz (1998), Zerbe and McCurdy (1999), and Ostrom (2000). On the one hand, Stiglitz (1998) advances four hypotheses to explain the lack of consensus in adopting Pareto or near-Pareto improvements in the government of the United States. He points to the inability of governments to make commitments; the bargaining inefficacy in the public sector; the destructive competition behavior shown by politicians; and the skepticism produced by the uncertainty of the proposed changes (p. 8-13). As a means to overcome these pitfalls, Stiglitz (1998) proposes to enhance openness of the policy process and to shift towards a participation/consensus building approach of policy decision-making.
On the other hand, Ostrom (2000) entails a literature review of laboratory and empirical research to advance a theory of collective action with multiple kinds of players –rational egoists, conditional cooperators, and willing punishers– which combined with an evolutionary approach to the study of human behavior, lead her to propose eight principles of institutional design for successful collective action. In short, Ostrom (2000) advocates for self-organized collective action, in which individuals are more prone to follow norms and show cooperative behavior in the extent to which they participate in designing of the institutional arrangements, and perceive that other members of the collectivity are following the norms as well. In Ostrom’s view, the role of the government is to recognize the right of individuals to organize through their own institutional arrangements, and to provide access to rapid, low cost means to resolve conflicts (p. 152). This argument supports the claim made by Zerbe and McCurdy (1999) that government intervention through public policy should not be based on the grounds of market failures, but in providing the institutions needed to reduce the cost of transactions between private individuals whenever it is efficient. That is, in any case in which the net benefit of an institutional arrangement is greater than the cost of providing it.
To sum up, the argument that public participation is a crucial element to improve policy outcomes is based in the assumptions that a participation/consensus building approach can overcome the pitfalls of the policy process; that this participation will lead to the design of Pareto, or a near-Pareto improvements; that individuals participating in designing the institutional arrangements of policies will be more prone to collective action; and that the role of the state is limited to reducing the costs of transaction in private interactions.
However, we should also bring to the discussion the literature raising critique to the deliberative democracy approach before advocating for more participation (Collingwood & Reedy, 2012; Nabatichi, 2012; Walker, McQuarrie, & Lee, 2015). Collingwood and Reedy (2012) claim that deliberation favors some groups of society over others, and the structure of deliberation events can introduce bias. In this same line, Nabatchi (2012) points out that several scholars raise the possibility of cooptation of deliberative democracy by the more powerful groups of society and interests. Walker et al. (2015) claim that because most of deliberative participation takes place in contexts of great inequalities of wealth, income, and organizational resources, participation tends to reproduce the structural problems of the society in which it takes place.
Once that the public participation argument is seen through the lenses of these critique, making the case for public participation gets more complex. If participation is said to be reproducing the structural inequality in a society, who is to benefit from the negotiated Pareto, or near-Pareto improvements? What is the guarantee that the self-governing institutional arrangements being negotiated will be fair to all members of society? And above all, should the role of the state be limited to reducing the cost of transactions among private individuals, even if those transactions are reproducing inequality? Or should the state have a more direct role in the design of institutional arrangements, aiming to make them fairer?
The call for increasing participation should be complemented with a strong normative discussion on how should participation tale place, who should be at the table, how should their participation influence the policy outcomes, and what kind of justice should be promoted to compensate the past inequalities. As Howlett, Ramesh, and Pearl (2009) claim, policy analysis should not stop at the individual or collective levels, but include also the structural level of society, engaging in a post-positivist normative analysis integrating values and social context into the discussion.
References
Collingwood, L. & Reedy, J (2012) Listening and responding criticisms of deliberative civic engagement. In, Nabatchi, Gastil, Wiksner, & Leighninger (Eds.) Democracy in Motion: Evaluating the practice and impact of deliberative civic engagement, Oxford University Press.
Howlett, M., Ramesh, M & Perl, A. (2009) Studying public policy: Policy cycles & policy subsystems. Oxford University Press.
Nabatchi, T. (2012) An introduction to deliberative civic engagement. In Nabatchi, Gastil, Wiksner, & Leighninger (Eds.) Democracy in Motion: Evaluating the practice and impact of deliberative civic engagement, Oxford University Press.
Ostrom, E. (2000) Collective action and the evolution of social norms. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 13 (3), pp. 137-158.
Stiglitz, J. (1998) The private uses of public interests: Incentives and institutions. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12 (2), pp. 3-22.
Walker, E., McQuarrie, M., & Lee, C. (2015) Rising participation in declining democracy. In Lee, C., McQuarri, M. & Walker, E. (Eds.) Democratizing Inequalities: Dilemmas of the new public participation, New York University Press.
Zerbe, R. O. & McCurdy, H. E. (1999) The failure of market failure. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 18 (4), pp. 558-578.Paragraph. Haz clic aquí para editar.
PhD Student of Public and Urban Policy
The New School
In his précis, José Galvez makes the argument that public participation is a crucial element in successful policy making. It also questions if our system is strong enough to involve the public in an active manner or if it begs for re-visiting. I will claim the latter. To build my argument, I will argue that advocating for more participation without engaging in a normative discussion questioning the system as it exist today, is likely to result in the reproduction of any society’s structural inequality.
The case for supporting public participation appears to be based on the arguments raised by Stiglitz (1998), Zerbe and McCurdy (1999), and Ostrom (2000). On the one hand, Stiglitz (1998) advances four hypotheses to explain the lack of consensus in adopting Pareto or near-Pareto improvements in the government of the United States. He points to the inability of governments to make commitments; the bargaining inefficacy in the public sector; the destructive competition behavior shown by politicians; and the skepticism produced by the uncertainty of the proposed changes (p. 8-13). As a means to overcome these pitfalls, Stiglitz (1998) proposes to enhance openness of the policy process and to shift towards a participation/consensus building approach of policy decision-making.
On the other hand, Ostrom (2000) entails a literature review of laboratory and empirical research to advance a theory of collective action with multiple kinds of players –rational egoists, conditional cooperators, and willing punishers– which combined with an evolutionary approach to the study of human behavior, lead her to propose eight principles of institutional design for successful collective action. In short, Ostrom (2000) advocates for self-organized collective action, in which individuals are more prone to follow norms and show cooperative behavior in the extent to which they participate in designing of the institutional arrangements, and perceive that other members of the collectivity are following the norms as well. In Ostrom’s view, the role of the government is to recognize the right of individuals to organize through their own institutional arrangements, and to provide access to rapid, low cost means to resolve conflicts (p. 152). This argument supports the claim made by Zerbe and McCurdy (1999) that government intervention through public policy should not be based on the grounds of market failures, but in providing the institutions needed to reduce the cost of transactions between private individuals whenever it is efficient. That is, in any case in which the net benefit of an institutional arrangement is greater than the cost of providing it.
To sum up, the argument that public participation is a crucial element to improve policy outcomes is based in the assumptions that a participation/consensus building approach can overcome the pitfalls of the policy process; that this participation will lead to the design of Pareto, or a near-Pareto improvements; that individuals participating in designing the institutional arrangements of policies will be more prone to collective action; and that the role of the state is limited to reducing the costs of transaction in private interactions.
However, we should also bring to the discussion the literature raising critique to the deliberative democracy approach before advocating for more participation (Collingwood & Reedy, 2012; Nabatichi, 2012; Walker, McQuarrie, & Lee, 2015). Collingwood and Reedy (2012) claim that deliberation favors some groups of society over others, and the structure of deliberation events can introduce bias. In this same line, Nabatchi (2012) points out that several scholars raise the possibility of cooptation of deliberative democracy by the more powerful groups of society and interests. Walker et al. (2015) claim that because most of deliberative participation takes place in contexts of great inequalities of wealth, income, and organizational resources, participation tends to reproduce the structural problems of the society in which it takes place.
Once that the public participation argument is seen through the lenses of these critique, making the case for public participation gets more complex. If participation is said to be reproducing the structural inequality in a society, who is to benefit from the negotiated Pareto, or near-Pareto improvements? What is the guarantee that the self-governing institutional arrangements being negotiated will be fair to all members of society? And above all, should the role of the state be limited to reducing the cost of transactions among private individuals, even if those transactions are reproducing inequality? Or should the state have a more direct role in the design of institutional arrangements, aiming to make them fairer?
The call for increasing participation should be complemented with a strong normative discussion on how should participation tale place, who should be at the table, how should their participation influence the policy outcomes, and what kind of justice should be promoted to compensate the past inequalities. As Howlett, Ramesh, and Pearl (2009) claim, policy analysis should not stop at the individual or collective levels, but include also the structural level of society, engaging in a post-positivist normative analysis integrating values and social context into the discussion.
References
Collingwood, L. & Reedy, J (2012) Listening and responding criticisms of deliberative civic engagement. In, Nabatchi, Gastil, Wiksner, & Leighninger (Eds.) Democracy in Motion: Evaluating the practice and impact of deliberative civic engagement, Oxford University Press.
Howlett, M., Ramesh, M & Perl, A. (2009) Studying public policy: Policy cycles & policy subsystems. Oxford University Press.
Nabatchi, T. (2012) An introduction to deliberative civic engagement. In Nabatchi, Gastil, Wiksner, & Leighninger (Eds.) Democracy in Motion: Evaluating the practice and impact of deliberative civic engagement, Oxford University Press.
Ostrom, E. (2000) Collective action and the evolution of social norms. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 13 (3), pp. 137-158.
Stiglitz, J. (1998) The private uses of public interests: Incentives and institutions. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12 (2), pp. 3-22.
Walker, E., McQuarrie, M., & Lee, C. (2015) Rising participation in declining democracy. In Lee, C., McQuarri, M. & Walker, E. (Eds.) Democratizing Inequalities: Dilemmas of the new public participation, New York University Press.
Zerbe, R. O. & McCurdy, H. E. (1999) The failure of market failure. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 18 (4), pp. 558-578.Paragraph. Haz clic aquí para editar.