In his paper, Jose Galvez Contreras, argues in favor of public policy embedded in collective action. His vision is that “when social actors align with the idea of public good - including the government - effective public policy may be possible.” As a committed social activist, Contreras’s vision is clearly a normative one; he approaches public policy within a framework of values that promote greater social and political equity. [1] Closely connected with this normative vision, is the promotion of public participation, engaging the public in policy analysis and public discourse. Participation in this lens is more desirable by virtue of being democratic and because it presumably leads to better policy outcomes.[2] He ends his piece with the question of “how the public can be involved in policy in a more active manner?”
As a fellow New School student, I share Contreras’s normative vision of the policy process, but worry about the limits of collective action, that the active involvement of social actors does not always align with ideas of public good. In light of populist swings in Europe and North America, that have led to Brexit vote in the UK and secured the Republican presidential candidacy for Donald Trump on an anti-immigration platform, will the greater involvement of the public in policy lead to better policy outcomes in the ‘Age of Immigration’?
My concerns are grounded in the work of Elinor Ostrom, who laid out a framework of experimental and real-world empirical evidence in support of collective action. Using linear public goods experiments, Ostrom demonstrated that individuals are willing to contribute generously to public goods. So long as their generosity is reciprocated they will continue to engage in cooperative actions. These ‘conditional cooperators’, however, are unlikely to tolerate free-riding for long, and will curtail their generosity when it is not reciprocated.[3] While Ostrom’s real world evidence deals primarily with natural resources, it is not great stretch of the imagination to see public services along the lines of Ostrom’s public goods experiments. In North America and Europe, individuals are willing to contribute high levels of tax to pay for public goods, including generous education, health and social safety nets, and will continue to do so when they believe that everyone is cooperating. However, when large numbers of ‘free-riders’ are perceived to be present, generosity will likely decline.
In the UK’s decision to leave the EU, often voiced in opposition to the large number of legal immigrants from the EU and illegal immigrants from the Middle East and Asia, and in Donald Trumps’ rhetoric against Mexican immigrants, it is not hard to hear the fear of ‘free-riders’ who are swarming over borders to take jobs and benefit from social programmes. Immigration advocates have consistently shown that immigrants are not an excessive burden on social programmes, and contribute more in taxes than they take out in benefits. (In the UK, immigrants are estimated to have contributed more than £3 billion in income taxes, while claiming roughly £0.5 billion in benefits.[4]) These evidence-based arguments appear to have fallen on deaf ears in the UK, and progressives often echo public choice theorists in their laments that the less-educated and sophisticated among the electorate are being manipulated by self-interested politicians who have little interest in the public good.
Or are they? Beyond free-riding, a common sentiment expressed towards immigrants is that they are not ‘following the rules’. A lead story in the New York Times on immigration in Denmark, captures the sentiments of a Danish man towards the new wave of Muslim migrants. “These Muslims want to keep their own culture, but we have our own rules here and everyone must follow them.”[5] For progressives these sentiments are deeply disturbing, but they echo in Ostrom’s work. In the real world examples of successful collective action, clear group boundaries are defined by members. Where there is rapid in-migration, self-organized resource regimes can rapidly fall apart, as “in-migration may bring new participants who do not trust others and do not rapidly learn social norms that have been established over a long period of time.”[6]
In the case of anti-immigrant voting in Europe and the US, the public may less be duped by self-interested politicians than flagging concern that newcomers are threatening common norms and with them, common resources. It is interesting to note that the great period of immigration to the US from Europe, from the late 1800s to 1920s, ended in advance of the modern welfare state. Between 1917 and 1924, literacy tests followed by national quotas effectively closed the door to mass migration. Within a decade, the New Deal had begun. Given our understanding of collective action, could the generous schemes have been introduced if migration were still a flood? Is there an inherent trade-off between the generosity of a country’s ‘collective action’ and its ability to accept outsiders?
[1] Howlett, Ramesh and Perl, Chapter 2: “Understanding Public Policy: Theoretical Approaches”.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ostrom, Elinor, “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms,” Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 14(3), 2000.
[4] Eaton, George, “How much do benefits paid to EU migrants cost Britain?”, The New Statesman, 16 June 2016 http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/welfare/2016/06/how-much-do-benefits-paid-eu-migrants-cost-britain
[5] Zucchino, David, “I’ve Become a Racist’: Migrant Wave Unleashes Danish Tensions Over Identity”, the New York Times,
[6] Ostrom, Elinor, “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms,” Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 14(3), 2000.
As a fellow New School student, I share Contreras’s normative vision of the policy process, but worry about the limits of collective action, that the active involvement of social actors does not always align with ideas of public good. In light of populist swings in Europe and North America, that have led to Brexit vote in the UK and secured the Republican presidential candidacy for Donald Trump on an anti-immigration platform, will the greater involvement of the public in policy lead to better policy outcomes in the ‘Age of Immigration’?
My concerns are grounded in the work of Elinor Ostrom, who laid out a framework of experimental and real-world empirical evidence in support of collective action. Using linear public goods experiments, Ostrom demonstrated that individuals are willing to contribute generously to public goods. So long as their generosity is reciprocated they will continue to engage in cooperative actions. These ‘conditional cooperators’, however, are unlikely to tolerate free-riding for long, and will curtail their generosity when it is not reciprocated.[3] While Ostrom’s real world evidence deals primarily with natural resources, it is not great stretch of the imagination to see public services along the lines of Ostrom’s public goods experiments. In North America and Europe, individuals are willing to contribute high levels of tax to pay for public goods, including generous education, health and social safety nets, and will continue to do so when they believe that everyone is cooperating. However, when large numbers of ‘free-riders’ are perceived to be present, generosity will likely decline.
In the UK’s decision to leave the EU, often voiced in opposition to the large number of legal immigrants from the EU and illegal immigrants from the Middle East and Asia, and in Donald Trumps’ rhetoric against Mexican immigrants, it is not hard to hear the fear of ‘free-riders’ who are swarming over borders to take jobs and benefit from social programmes. Immigration advocates have consistently shown that immigrants are not an excessive burden on social programmes, and contribute more in taxes than they take out in benefits. (In the UK, immigrants are estimated to have contributed more than £3 billion in income taxes, while claiming roughly £0.5 billion in benefits.[4]) These evidence-based arguments appear to have fallen on deaf ears in the UK, and progressives often echo public choice theorists in their laments that the less-educated and sophisticated among the electorate are being manipulated by self-interested politicians who have little interest in the public good.
Or are they? Beyond free-riding, a common sentiment expressed towards immigrants is that they are not ‘following the rules’. A lead story in the New York Times on immigration in Denmark, captures the sentiments of a Danish man towards the new wave of Muslim migrants. “These Muslims want to keep their own culture, but we have our own rules here and everyone must follow them.”[5] For progressives these sentiments are deeply disturbing, but they echo in Ostrom’s work. In the real world examples of successful collective action, clear group boundaries are defined by members. Where there is rapid in-migration, self-organized resource regimes can rapidly fall apart, as “in-migration may bring new participants who do not trust others and do not rapidly learn social norms that have been established over a long period of time.”[6]
In the case of anti-immigrant voting in Europe and the US, the public may less be duped by self-interested politicians than flagging concern that newcomers are threatening common norms and with them, common resources. It is interesting to note that the great period of immigration to the US from Europe, from the late 1800s to 1920s, ended in advance of the modern welfare state. Between 1917 and 1924, literacy tests followed by national quotas effectively closed the door to mass migration. Within a decade, the New Deal had begun. Given our understanding of collective action, could the generous schemes have been introduced if migration were still a flood? Is there an inherent trade-off between the generosity of a country’s ‘collective action’ and its ability to accept outsiders?
[1] Howlett, Ramesh and Perl, Chapter 2: “Understanding Public Policy: Theoretical Approaches”.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ostrom, Elinor, “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms,” Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 14(3), 2000.
[4] Eaton, George, “How much do benefits paid to EU migrants cost Britain?”, The New Statesman, 16 June 2016 http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/welfare/2016/06/how-much-do-benefits-paid-eu-migrants-cost-britain
[5] Zucchino, David, “I’ve Become a Racist’: Migrant Wave Unleashes Danish Tensions Over Identity”, the New York Times,
[6] Ostrom, Elinor, “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms,” Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 14(3), 2000.