By Bart
Rita’s post echoes popular concerns about the excessive influence of moneyed interests in our political and policymaking systems. Stone (1997) shares these concerns, suggesting three areas where money undermines democratic ideals: high costs of running for office create biases towards candidates who are individually wealthy or represent business interests; once elected, representatives are more responsive to the needs of their high-income constituents; and corporations seek competitive advantages by using campaign contributions to influence the rules of the marketplace in their favor. This narrative is appealing on both sides of the political spectrum perhaps because it seems intuitively obvious that politicians will favor their largest donors, but the evidence is actually much less clear, and in focusing on material influence on politics, we may risk losing site of much more complicated ideological influences.
Gilens and Page (2014) published an academic paper that made headlines by examining policy decisions and how they aligned with the surveyed preferences of the wealthy and the middle class. Their conclusion seemed to confirm suspicions that American politics are controlled largely by the wealthy:
"Multivariate analysis indicates that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence. The results provide substantial support for theories of Economic-Elite Domination and for theories of Biased Pluralism, but not for theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy or Majoritarian Pluralism."
Media reports went even further, with headlines announcing that research has proven that America is indeed an oligarchy.
However, the subsequent criticisms and further analysis of that study received much less attention. The Gilens and Page (2014) study analyzed 1,779 bills, of which the rich and middle class agreed 89.6% of the time. Vox found that of the small number of bills where the rich and middle class disagreed, “on average, the groups' opinion gaps on the 185 bills is 10.9 percentage points; so, say, 45 percent of the middle class might support a bill while 55.9 percent of the rich support it.” The gap between the policy objectives of the rich and middle class were generally not wide within areas of disagreement.
Another analysis using the same data by Branham, Soroka, and Wlezien (2016) also found that among bills where there was disagreement between the preferences of the rich and the middle class, outcomes favored the rich 53 percent of the time and the middle class 47 percent of the time—a difference that is not statistically significant in the study. What may be most surprising, however, is that in analyzing the survey data from the 1990s, the authors found that the wealthy favored publicly financed elections, while the middle class opposed it—consistent with a study by Raja and Schaffner (2011) that found that “In contrast to conventional wisdom, we show that support for public financing is highest among those perceived to benefit the most from the current system.”
Furthermore, evidence suggests that Stone’s (1997) argument that independently wealthy candidates have an advantage in the electoral process is not necessarily correct. Milyo and Groseclose (1999) found that in 1992 House of Representatives elections, wealthy incumbents neither received greater proportions of votes, spent more or raised more campaign funds, nor deterred challengers.
The article Rita cites by Furmin (2013) addresses the large amount of money spent on winning seats in the House of Representatives and Senate. But, there’s a danger of circularity in this type of analysis. It may be that money spent determines election outcomes—but it could also be that candidates perceived as having desirable qualities and appealing platforms elicit more campaign contributions. Interestingly, the article lists Elizabeth Warren as being the largest campaign contribution recipient in 2012 senate races, with over $42 million, over half of which consisted of large donations, including PACs. And yet, she’s rarely portrayed as having ulterior motives as a result.
In studying economic models of policymaking, one of the main critiques has been portrayals of citizens as purely self-interested individuals. We should be careful to remember that policymakers are also individuals who operate within systems of values, beliefs, and ideologies, and are not necessarily simply out to maximize their campaign contributions (though that also exists). Campaign finance reform was enacted by Senators Russ Feingold (D-WI) and John McCain (R-AZ), two very established senators who both benefitted from corporate donors. However, the law was struck down (in large part) by the Supreme Court, the members of which do not run for reelection and are therefore free from donor influence (you could argue that donor influence led to their appointment, but there’s no reason they should remain loyal after appointment). This suggests that power dynamics are not purely material, but engrained in ideological systems in which actors operate. Congressmen may advance private interests because of clientelistic donor relationships, but they could also do it because of a genuine belief that it is in the best interests of the country. Such beliefs, which are shared not just by policymakers but by large portions of the middle class and even poor, are much more difficult to change than reforming campaign finance—but addressing the issue of money in elections would be a good place to start.
References:
Gilens, Martin, and Benjamin I. Page. "Testing theories of American politics: Elites, interest groups, and average citizens." Perspectives on politics 12.03 (2014): 564-581.
Branham, J. Alexander, Stuart N. Soroka, and Christopher Wlezien. "When do the Rich Win?." Unpublished manuscript. Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin (2015).
La Raja, Raymond J., and Brian F. Schaffner. "Explaining the unpopularity of public funding for congressional elections." Electoral Studies 30.3 (2011): 525-533.
Milyo, Jeffrey, and Timothy Groseclose. "Electoral Effects of Incumbent Wealth, The." JL & Econ. 42 (1999): 699.
Rita’s post echoes popular concerns about the excessive influence of moneyed interests in our political and policymaking systems. Stone (1997) shares these concerns, suggesting three areas where money undermines democratic ideals: high costs of running for office create biases towards candidates who are individually wealthy or represent business interests; once elected, representatives are more responsive to the needs of their high-income constituents; and corporations seek competitive advantages by using campaign contributions to influence the rules of the marketplace in their favor. This narrative is appealing on both sides of the political spectrum perhaps because it seems intuitively obvious that politicians will favor their largest donors, but the evidence is actually much less clear, and in focusing on material influence on politics, we may risk losing site of much more complicated ideological influences.
Gilens and Page (2014) published an academic paper that made headlines by examining policy decisions and how they aligned with the surveyed preferences of the wealthy and the middle class. Their conclusion seemed to confirm suspicions that American politics are controlled largely by the wealthy:
"Multivariate analysis indicates that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence. The results provide substantial support for theories of Economic-Elite Domination and for theories of Biased Pluralism, but not for theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy or Majoritarian Pluralism."
Media reports went even further, with headlines announcing that research has proven that America is indeed an oligarchy.
However, the subsequent criticisms and further analysis of that study received much less attention. The Gilens and Page (2014) study analyzed 1,779 bills, of which the rich and middle class agreed 89.6% of the time. Vox found that of the small number of bills where the rich and middle class disagreed, “on average, the groups' opinion gaps on the 185 bills is 10.9 percentage points; so, say, 45 percent of the middle class might support a bill while 55.9 percent of the rich support it.” The gap between the policy objectives of the rich and middle class were generally not wide within areas of disagreement.
Another analysis using the same data by Branham, Soroka, and Wlezien (2016) also found that among bills where there was disagreement between the preferences of the rich and the middle class, outcomes favored the rich 53 percent of the time and the middle class 47 percent of the time—a difference that is not statistically significant in the study. What may be most surprising, however, is that in analyzing the survey data from the 1990s, the authors found that the wealthy favored publicly financed elections, while the middle class opposed it—consistent with a study by Raja and Schaffner (2011) that found that “In contrast to conventional wisdom, we show that support for public financing is highest among those perceived to benefit the most from the current system.”
Furthermore, evidence suggests that Stone’s (1997) argument that independently wealthy candidates have an advantage in the electoral process is not necessarily correct. Milyo and Groseclose (1999) found that in 1992 House of Representatives elections, wealthy incumbents neither received greater proportions of votes, spent more or raised more campaign funds, nor deterred challengers.
The article Rita cites by Furmin (2013) addresses the large amount of money spent on winning seats in the House of Representatives and Senate. But, there’s a danger of circularity in this type of analysis. It may be that money spent determines election outcomes—but it could also be that candidates perceived as having desirable qualities and appealing platforms elicit more campaign contributions. Interestingly, the article lists Elizabeth Warren as being the largest campaign contribution recipient in 2012 senate races, with over $42 million, over half of which consisted of large donations, including PACs. And yet, she’s rarely portrayed as having ulterior motives as a result.
In studying economic models of policymaking, one of the main critiques has been portrayals of citizens as purely self-interested individuals. We should be careful to remember that policymakers are also individuals who operate within systems of values, beliefs, and ideologies, and are not necessarily simply out to maximize their campaign contributions (though that also exists). Campaign finance reform was enacted by Senators Russ Feingold (D-WI) and John McCain (R-AZ), two very established senators who both benefitted from corporate donors. However, the law was struck down (in large part) by the Supreme Court, the members of which do not run for reelection and are therefore free from donor influence (you could argue that donor influence led to their appointment, but there’s no reason they should remain loyal after appointment). This suggests that power dynamics are not purely material, but engrained in ideological systems in which actors operate. Congressmen may advance private interests because of clientelistic donor relationships, but they could also do it because of a genuine belief that it is in the best interests of the country. Such beliefs, which are shared not just by policymakers but by large portions of the middle class and even poor, are much more difficult to change than reforming campaign finance—but addressing the issue of money in elections would be a good place to start.
References:
Gilens, Martin, and Benjamin I. Page. "Testing theories of American politics: Elites, interest groups, and average citizens." Perspectives on politics 12.03 (2014): 564-581.
Branham, J. Alexander, Stuart N. Soroka, and Christopher Wlezien. "When do the Rich Win?." Unpublished manuscript. Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin (2015).
La Raja, Raymond J., and Brian F. Schaffner. "Explaining the unpopularity of public funding for congressional elections." Electoral Studies 30.3 (2011): 525-533.
Milyo, Jeffrey, and Timothy Groseclose. "Electoral Effects of Incumbent Wealth, The." JL & Econ. 42 (1999): 699.