By David López García
In her précis, Rita Sandoval argues that this week’s readings provide little insight into how to achieve structural change from within the confines of an established political system. Although I agree with her claim, I will make the argument that it is so because the discipline of public policy has never envisioned such a transformative goal. However, by comparing the pluralist approach to the post-pluralist perspective proposed by Stone (2012), I argue that the latter shows insight into how to achieve structural change, namely by questioning the role of market institutions in mainstream policy theory.
From the beginning of the discipline, Harold Lasswell proposed that policy science should be multi-disciplinary –embracing the work and findings of other scientific fields–, problem-solving oriented –orienting itself towards the solution of real world problems–, and explicitly normative –acknowledging values and goals when stating which solution would be better than others (Howlett, Ramesh & Pearl, 2009). The rationalist approach accepts that the market is the most efficient mechanism to allocate society’s resources, and only when there are market failures political institutions can act to enhance overall social welfare (Howlett, et al., 2009). Incrementalism claims that policies should build up from the current situation, step by step, and in small degrees (Lindblom, 1959). The public policy discipline and its multiple approaches aim at helping governments to find conclusions and recommendations applicable to existing social problems. However, the structural change of society has been and is still absent from its guiding tenets.
The pluralist approach to public policy, one of the most influential in liberal democracies, relies on and promotes market mechanisms to resolve policy disputes. It claims that the role of government is “to produce public policies that represent the interests of the electorate, resolve conflicts, reflect reasonable compromises among competing perspectives, and ensure the continued stability of the collectivity along with its preferred economic and cultural characteristics” (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 13). Building in the rationalist approach, it advocates for institutions that limit the power of government and ensure that its policies are responsive to public preferences. Building from incrementalism, it calls for an incremental ‘self-correcting’ process of policy change. Pluralism relies on interests groups of society to be the watchdogs of their own interests, which in turn will hold government accountable for what it does and alert the public when their interests are threatened (Schneider & Ingram, 1997). Pluralism assumes that interests groups of society have perfect information, and inhabit a perfect political market, in which no interest group holds any kind of political power monopoly. In short, pluralism assumes the existence of “an ‘invisible hand’ that guides a democratic process to produce policy that reflects reasonable, responsible compromises among competing perspectives” (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 21).
The post-pluralist view put forward by Stone (2012) puts into question the market model proposed by pluralism. The author claims that “the starting point of a political analysis should be a political community, not a market” (p. 11). Unlike the market model, in a political community members are motivated both by altruism and self-interest; people fight about and act upon the meaning of public interest; the boundary between influence and coercion is always contested; information is interpretive, incomplete and strategic; and power is always a contested issue (Stone, 2012, p. 34). At the core of Stone’s argument is the claim that the categories of thought for policy analysis in a political community are themselves constructed in political struggle. That is to say that there is no ‘invisible hand’ underpinning the natural achievement of policies representing the general interest of the public, but political struggle producing winners and losers.
By taking distance from market mechanisms in public policy, Stone’s analysis calls to acknowledge that social goals such as equity, efficiency, welfare, liberty, and security, are socially constructed through political struggle, which points out to a series of policy paradoxes. Social problems and policy solutions are also contested affairs, in which groups of society with power and leverage will win the battle of framing and choosing courses of public action. Unlike pluralism, which recast and limits the role of government and public policy in society to the weighing and balancing of competing interests (Schneider & Ingram, 1997), Stone’s analysis on the political struggle over policy goals, problems, and solutions, sheds light on the caveats of relying on market mechanisms to resolve policy disputes. By acknowledging that economic structures shape and are shaped by the political community, we can put into question the status quo and advocate for structural change.
References
Howlett, M., Ramesh, M., & Perl, A. (2009) Studying public policy: Policy cycles and policy subsystems. Oxford University Press.
Lindblom, C.E. (1959). The science of muddling through. Public Administration Review, 19 (2) pp. 79-88.
Schneider, A.L. & Ingram, H. (1997). Policy design for democracy. University Press of Kansas.
Stone, D. (2012) Policy paradox: The art of political decision-making. Third Edition. Norton & Company.
In her précis, Rita Sandoval argues that this week’s readings provide little insight into how to achieve structural change from within the confines of an established political system. Although I agree with her claim, I will make the argument that it is so because the discipline of public policy has never envisioned such a transformative goal. However, by comparing the pluralist approach to the post-pluralist perspective proposed by Stone (2012), I argue that the latter shows insight into how to achieve structural change, namely by questioning the role of market institutions in mainstream policy theory.
From the beginning of the discipline, Harold Lasswell proposed that policy science should be multi-disciplinary –embracing the work and findings of other scientific fields–, problem-solving oriented –orienting itself towards the solution of real world problems–, and explicitly normative –acknowledging values and goals when stating which solution would be better than others (Howlett, Ramesh & Pearl, 2009). The rationalist approach accepts that the market is the most efficient mechanism to allocate society’s resources, and only when there are market failures political institutions can act to enhance overall social welfare (Howlett, et al., 2009). Incrementalism claims that policies should build up from the current situation, step by step, and in small degrees (Lindblom, 1959). The public policy discipline and its multiple approaches aim at helping governments to find conclusions and recommendations applicable to existing social problems. However, the structural change of society has been and is still absent from its guiding tenets.
The pluralist approach to public policy, one of the most influential in liberal democracies, relies on and promotes market mechanisms to resolve policy disputes. It claims that the role of government is “to produce public policies that represent the interests of the electorate, resolve conflicts, reflect reasonable compromises among competing perspectives, and ensure the continued stability of the collectivity along with its preferred economic and cultural characteristics” (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 13). Building in the rationalist approach, it advocates for institutions that limit the power of government and ensure that its policies are responsive to public preferences. Building from incrementalism, it calls for an incremental ‘self-correcting’ process of policy change. Pluralism relies on interests groups of society to be the watchdogs of their own interests, which in turn will hold government accountable for what it does and alert the public when their interests are threatened (Schneider & Ingram, 1997). Pluralism assumes that interests groups of society have perfect information, and inhabit a perfect political market, in which no interest group holds any kind of political power monopoly. In short, pluralism assumes the existence of “an ‘invisible hand’ that guides a democratic process to produce policy that reflects reasonable, responsible compromises among competing perspectives” (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 21).
The post-pluralist view put forward by Stone (2012) puts into question the market model proposed by pluralism. The author claims that “the starting point of a political analysis should be a political community, not a market” (p. 11). Unlike the market model, in a political community members are motivated both by altruism and self-interest; people fight about and act upon the meaning of public interest; the boundary between influence and coercion is always contested; information is interpretive, incomplete and strategic; and power is always a contested issue (Stone, 2012, p. 34). At the core of Stone’s argument is the claim that the categories of thought for policy analysis in a political community are themselves constructed in political struggle. That is to say that there is no ‘invisible hand’ underpinning the natural achievement of policies representing the general interest of the public, but political struggle producing winners and losers.
By taking distance from market mechanisms in public policy, Stone’s analysis calls to acknowledge that social goals such as equity, efficiency, welfare, liberty, and security, are socially constructed through political struggle, which points out to a series of policy paradoxes. Social problems and policy solutions are also contested affairs, in which groups of society with power and leverage will win the battle of framing and choosing courses of public action. Unlike pluralism, which recast and limits the role of government and public policy in society to the weighing and balancing of competing interests (Schneider & Ingram, 1997), Stone’s analysis on the political struggle over policy goals, problems, and solutions, sheds light on the caveats of relying on market mechanisms to resolve policy disputes. By acknowledging that economic structures shape and are shaped by the political community, we can put into question the status quo and advocate for structural change.
References
Howlett, M., Ramesh, M., & Perl, A. (2009) Studying public policy: Policy cycles and policy subsystems. Oxford University Press.
Lindblom, C.E. (1959). The science of muddling through. Public Administration Review, 19 (2) pp. 79-88.
Schneider, A.L. & Ingram, H. (1997). Policy design for democracy. University Press of Kansas.
Stone, D. (2012) Policy paradox: The art of political decision-making. Third Edition. Norton & Company.