Author: Jason
When Deborah Stone wrote her seminal work Policy Paradox in the late 1980s, the emerging field of public policy was dominated by the idea that policy analysis should be a purely rational, scientific endeavor. Echoing Karl Polanyi's theory of embeddedness, Stone was convinced that this rationality project of disembedding policymaking from politics was "an impossible dream" because the very categories of thought underlying the rational model of decision-making – such as those pertaining to equity, efficiency, security, and liberty – are themselves paradoxical and defined through political struggle. "Both policy and thinking about policy are produced in political communities," Stone eloquently stated (2002, p. 10). In order to unravel the paradoxes and ambiguities of the essential analytical concepts in politics and policy analysis, Stone developed the market-polis framework.
In her essay, Sandoval asserts that the market-polis framework and the other theories covered in this week's readings – pluralism, elitism, the faces of power, and public choice – can help us better understand how public policy is shaped. Furthermore, Sandoval questions whether such models and theories provide enough "insight into how to achieve structural change from within the confines of an established political system." While I agree with Sandoval's former assertion, I am uncertain and unconvinced about her latter argument, especially in regards to Stone's market-polis framework.
Using the excellent example of how money influences U.S. elections and politics, Sandoval challenges one of Stone's policy solutions: reforming decision-making structures to reallocate power (or constitutional engineering). Sandoval asks "in a democracy with an electoral system so deeply corrupted by private interest, how does one reshape the political landscape? Although Sandoval correctly points out that campaign finance reform requires a willingness to act on the part of politicians who may have their hands tied by wealthy campaign donors, Stone nevertheless contends that ideas and portrayals are more central to power in political decision-making than traditional forms of power such as money, votes, and offices (2002, p. 34). In other words, power is not merely reflected in concrete, visible decisions, but there also exists a less apparent (or hidden) face of power in society's dominant ideas and values (Bachrachand & Baratz, 1962).[1]
Therefore, not only can Stone's framework offer insight into the power dynamics within the polis, it can also serve as an analytical tool for those seeking structural change because it can help them better understand and articulate how dominant values and ideas are constructed and maintained in today's "market society," which in turn may help resolve surface conflicts over the struggle of ideas (e.g. whether the individual liberty of a wealthy person to donate an obscene amount of money to elected officials constrains the freedom of society as a whole) and motivate those who bear the burden of any policy to organize for policy change. To take just one example, it can be argued that the unexpected rise of Bernie Sanders – a policymaker seeking structural change – as a legitimate presidential candidate was driven by how he expertly used certain words, symbols (“the political revolution”) and numbers to garner support and build alliances around his ideas that challenged the dominant values and ideas of the market society, which he pointed to as the culprit for the nation’s growing income inequality and poverty problems, among other things. Granted, while Sanders did not win the democratic primary election, the portrayal of his ideas was strong enough to redefine the goals of the democratic party as well as Hillary Clinton’s campaign platform. It remains to be seen, however, whether the supporters of Sanders’ political revolution can stay motivated to fight for and bring about any meaningful structural change.
Even though my account above is a rather sanguine view of Stone's framework, I do in fact agree with Williams' critique that it allows moral relativism and offers little to establish normative conceptions about how society, democracy, and representation should operate (van Ostaijen & Jhagroe, 2015). Nonetheless, considering the stated aims of Policy Paradox, I don't think Stone ever intended to develop a universal standard of morality or a clear road map for how things ought to be. Nor do I think that either of these are even possible given all people do not have the same ontological and epistemological stances. Besides, it seems to me that if Stone proposed a best way for, say, campaign finance reform, she would then be advocating for what her framework sets out to challenge: a dominant way of thinking about policy (van Ostaijen & Jhagroe, 2015).
Footnotes
[1] Several scholars have expanded on the dimensions of power to include a third "invisible" face and a fourth face based on Foucault's idea of power's omnipresence (Digeser, 1992). Nonetheless, a further discussion of the four dimensions of power is beyond the scope of this essay.
External References
Digeser, P. (1992). The fourth face of power. The Journal of Politics, 54(04), 977-1007.
Polanyi, K. (1957). The Great Transformation: the Political and Economic Origin of Our Time. Beacon Press.
van Ostaijen, M., & Jhagroe, S. (2015). "Get those voices at the table!": Interview with Deborah Stone. Policy Sciences, 48(1), 127.
When Deborah Stone wrote her seminal work Policy Paradox in the late 1980s, the emerging field of public policy was dominated by the idea that policy analysis should be a purely rational, scientific endeavor. Echoing Karl Polanyi's theory of embeddedness, Stone was convinced that this rationality project of disembedding policymaking from politics was "an impossible dream" because the very categories of thought underlying the rational model of decision-making – such as those pertaining to equity, efficiency, security, and liberty – are themselves paradoxical and defined through political struggle. "Both policy and thinking about policy are produced in political communities," Stone eloquently stated (2002, p. 10). In order to unravel the paradoxes and ambiguities of the essential analytical concepts in politics and policy analysis, Stone developed the market-polis framework.
In her essay, Sandoval asserts that the market-polis framework and the other theories covered in this week's readings – pluralism, elitism, the faces of power, and public choice – can help us better understand how public policy is shaped. Furthermore, Sandoval questions whether such models and theories provide enough "insight into how to achieve structural change from within the confines of an established political system." While I agree with Sandoval's former assertion, I am uncertain and unconvinced about her latter argument, especially in regards to Stone's market-polis framework.
Using the excellent example of how money influences U.S. elections and politics, Sandoval challenges one of Stone's policy solutions: reforming decision-making structures to reallocate power (or constitutional engineering). Sandoval asks "in a democracy with an electoral system so deeply corrupted by private interest, how does one reshape the political landscape? Although Sandoval correctly points out that campaign finance reform requires a willingness to act on the part of politicians who may have their hands tied by wealthy campaign donors, Stone nevertheless contends that ideas and portrayals are more central to power in political decision-making than traditional forms of power such as money, votes, and offices (2002, p. 34). In other words, power is not merely reflected in concrete, visible decisions, but there also exists a less apparent (or hidden) face of power in society's dominant ideas and values (Bachrachand & Baratz, 1962).[1]
Therefore, not only can Stone's framework offer insight into the power dynamics within the polis, it can also serve as an analytical tool for those seeking structural change because it can help them better understand and articulate how dominant values and ideas are constructed and maintained in today's "market society," which in turn may help resolve surface conflicts over the struggle of ideas (e.g. whether the individual liberty of a wealthy person to donate an obscene amount of money to elected officials constrains the freedom of society as a whole) and motivate those who bear the burden of any policy to organize for policy change. To take just one example, it can be argued that the unexpected rise of Bernie Sanders – a policymaker seeking structural change – as a legitimate presidential candidate was driven by how he expertly used certain words, symbols (“the political revolution”) and numbers to garner support and build alliances around his ideas that challenged the dominant values and ideas of the market society, which he pointed to as the culprit for the nation’s growing income inequality and poverty problems, among other things. Granted, while Sanders did not win the democratic primary election, the portrayal of his ideas was strong enough to redefine the goals of the democratic party as well as Hillary Clinton’s campaign platform. It remains to be seen, however, whether the supporters of Sanders’ political revolution can stay motivated to fight for and bring about any meaningful structural change.
Even though my account above is a rather sanguine view of Stone's framework, I do in fact agree with Williams' critique that it allows moral relativism and offers little to establish normative conceptions about how society, democracy, and representation should operate (van Ostaijen & Jhagroe, 2015). Nonetheless, considering the stated aims of Policy Paradox, I don't think Stone ever intended to develop a universal standard of morality or a clear road map for how things ought to be. Nor do I think that either of these are even possible given all people do not have the same ontological and epistemological stances. Besides, it seems to me that if Stone proposed a best way for, say, campaign finance reform, she would then be advocating for what her framework sets out to challenge: a dominant way of thinking about policy (van Ostaijen & Jhagroe, 2015).
Footnotes
[1] Several scholars have expanded on the dimensions of power to include a third "invisible" face and a fourth face based on Foucault's idea of power's omnipresence (Digeser, 1992). Nonetheless, a further discussion of the four dimensions of power is beyond the scope of this essay.
External References
Digeser, P. (1992). The fourth face of power. The Journal of Politics, 54(04), 977-1007.
Polanyi, K. (1957). The Great Transformation: the Political and Economic Origin of Our Time. Beacon Press.
van Ostaijen, M., & Jhagroe, S. (2015). "Get those voices at the table!": Interview with Deborah Stone. Policy Sciences, 48(1), 127.