By Bart
Using the Cuban Missile Crisis as a case study, Allison and Zelikow (1999) challenge the tendency to put ourselves in the position of state actors in international relations and view their actions as those of rational individuals. While the rational actor model of international relations provides compelling and useful explanations in some situations, its simplicity also obscures the complexity of decision processes behind actions. However, an improved understanding of how organizations and bureaucracies produce outcomes can also illuminate the difficulties in changing how organizations work.
Allison and Zelikow (1999) introduce two models to explain the Cuban Missile Crisis. Model I is based on rational actors, while Model II takes an organizational behavioral approach to the situation. According to Model II, the organizational behavioral approach, what Model I analysts consider “acts” and “choices” are instead thought of as outputs of large organizations functioning according to regular patterns of behavior.
Model I’s underlying understanding is that important events have important causes—that organizations or governments perform large actions for important reasons. However, the contribution of Model II is that it emphasizes that Model II must be balanced by the appreciation that “monoliths are black boxes covering various gears and levers in a highly differentiated decision making structure” and “large acts result from innumerable and often conflicting smaller actions by individuals at various levels of organizations in the service of a variety of only partially compatible conceptions of national goals, organizational goals, and political objectives.” In analysis using Model II, the subjects are neither specific individuals nor entire governments, but rather are organizations, and their behavior is explained in terms of organizational purposes and practices shared by members of the organization, not those peculiar to one individual.
The model of organizational behavior described by Allison and Zelikow (1999) is one that does learn and evolve to a degree, but also exhibits a high degree of inertia. Also, organizations and their existing programs and routines constrain behavior by addressing new situations in ways in which they are already oriented.
Roy (2009) analyses two grassroots groups, Hezbollah and SPARC, who have evolved to become formal institutions occupying a middle space between state and community, which “both resist and comply with top-down forms of rule.” However, both organizations, through their interactions and transactions with other organizations, have taken positions of collaboration rather than confrontation, and thereby implicitly accepted visions of urban renewal. SPARC, in particular, challenges terms of engagement with authorities, but not the authorities’ control over urban planning and development. This interpretation of SPARC and Hezbollah is consistent with Allison and Zelikow (1999) argument that as organizations evolve, policy preferences reflect mainly non-ideological organizational imperatives and develop “isomorphism.”
In contrast, Romer (2010) pursues organizational change not from below, but above. Arguing that new rules and frameworks are needed to improve living standards, Romer suggests that rather than reform existing organizations, we create new charter cities with new, expert-created rules. Because such rules would be decided prior to the city’s occupation, democratic and institutional processes could be sidestepped, and residents would consent by voluntarily moving to the city. The success of the new charter cities, and the movement of resources and population to them, could then encourage existing organization elsewhere to adopt the same new rules.
While the organizational behavior approach to policy analysis is more complicated than the rational actor model, it provides a more nuanced understanding of how complex interactions within organizations create certain outcomes. However, it can also help to explain the challenges to changing organizations and the outcomes they produce. The case of SPARC and Hezbollah shows the potential successes and limitations of grassroots groups moving into the realm of formal bureaucracy. Meanwhile, Romer’s attempts to bypassing existing organizations by creating charter cities has so far proven fruitless.
Discussion Questions:
References
Allison, Graham and Philip Zelikow. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Longman, 1999
Romer, Paul, Technologies, Rules, and Progress: The Case for Charter Cities, Center for Global Development Essay, Washington, D.C., 2010.
Roy, Ananya, “Civic Governmentality: The Politics of Inclusion in Beirut and Mumbai,”Antipode, 41(1):159-179.
Using the Cuban Missile Crisis as a case study, Allison and Zelikow (1999) challenge the tendency to put ourselves in the position of state actors in international relations and view their actions as those of rational individuals. While the rational actor model of international relations provides compelling and useful explanations in some situations, its simplicity also obscures the complexity of decision processes behind actions. However, an improved understanding of how organizations and bureaucracies produce outcomes can also illuminate the difficulties in changing how organizations work.
Allison and Zelikow (1999) introduce two models to explain the Cuban Missile Crisis. Model I is based on rational actors, while Model II takes an organizational behavioral approach to the situation. According to Model II, the organizational behavioral approach, what Model I analysts consider “acts” and “choices” are instead thought of as outputs of large organizations functioning according to regular patterns of behavior.
Model I’s underlying understanding is that important events have important causes—that organizations or governments perform large actions for important reasons. However, the contribution of Model II is that it emphasizes that Model II must be balanced by the appreciation that “monoliths are black boxes covering various gears and levers in a highly differentiated decision making structure” and “large acts result from innumerable and often conflicting smaller actions by individuals at various levels of organizations in the service of a variety of only partially compatible conceptions of national goals, organizational goals, and political objectives.” In analysis using Model II, the subjects are neither specific individuals nor entire governments, but rather are organizations, and their behavior is explained in terms of organizational purposes and practices shared by members of the organization, not those peculiar to one individual.
The model of organizational behavior described by Allison and Zelikow (1999) is one that does learn and evolve to a degree, but also exhibits a high degree of inertia. Also, organizations and their existing programs and routines constrain behavior by addressing new situations in ways in which they are already oriented.
Roy (2009) analyses two grassroots groups, Hezbollah and SPARC, who have evolved to become formal institutions occupying a middle space between state and community, which “both resist and comply with top-down forms of rule.” However, both organizations, through their interactions and transactions with other organizations, have taken positions of collaboration rather than confrontation, and thereby implicitly accepted visions of urban renewal. SPARC, in particular, challenges terms of engagement with authorities, but not the authorities’ control over urban planning and development. This interpretation of SPARC and Hezbollah is consistent with Allison and Zelikow (1999) argument that as organizations evolve, policy preferences reflect mainly non-ideological organizational imperatives and develop “isomorphism.”
In contrast, Romer (2010) pursues organizational change not from below, but above. Arguing that new rules and frameworks are needed to improve living standards, Romer suggests that rather than reform existing organizations, we create new charter cities with new, expert-created rules. Because such rules would be decided prior to the city’s occupation, democratic and institutional processes could be sidestepped, and residents would consent by voluntarily moving to the city. The success of the new charter cities, and the movement of resources and population to them, could then encourage existing organization elsewhere to adopt the same new rules.
While the organizational behavior approach to policy analysis is more complicated than the rational actor model, it provides a more nuanced understanding of how complex interactions within organizations create certain outcomes. However, it can also help to explain the challenges to changing organizations and the outcomes they produce. The case of SPARC and Hezbollah shows the potential successes and limitations of grassroots groups moving into the realm of formal bureaucracy. Meanwhile, Romer’s attempts to bypassing existing organizations by creating charter cities has so far proven fruitless.
Discussion Questions:
- The ideology behind Romer’s Charter Cities is easy to dismiss as colonial and anti-democratic. But is there merit to his approach of creating new bureaucracies and organizations rather than attempting to incrementally change existing ones, or relying on competition between rules and organizations as a driver of change?
- Allison and Zelikow (1999) acknowledge that on the spectrum of organizations, there is a “gray zone” between formal and informal, although Allison and Zelikow (1999)’s theory seems to apply primarily or exclusively to the formal end of the spectrum. Black Lives Matter has actively avoided centralization and formal hierarchy, and yet has managed to amass a significant degree of political influence. What would be the advantages and limitations to continuing to operate in such a gray area, and is it feasible in the long term?
References
Allison, Graham and Philip Zelikow. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Longman, 1999
Romer, Paul, Technologies, Rules, and Progress: The Case for Charter Cities, Center for Global Development Essay, Washington, D.C., 2010.
Roy, Ananya, “Civic Governmentality: The Politics of Inclusion in Beirut and Mumbai,”Antipode, 41(1):159-179.