Samantha Cocco-Klein
October 24, 2016
Government bureaucracies have been identified as key actors within policy making. Ostensibly created to assist political executives to perform tasks entrusted to government, given the size and complexity of these responsibilities, bureaucracies have come to exert their own considerable influence on policy decisions. The scope, scale and shape of this influence are the subject of public policy theory and models – which are grounded in an understanding of domestic or single-country bureaucracies. At the same time, the international system is seen to be playing an increasingly important role in domestic policy-making. (Howlett, Ramesh and Perl, 2009) A wide range of international organizations, from the United Nations programmes and agencies to the Bretton Woods institutions, exert influence on a wide range of policies, from finance to fisheries, from defense to education. There is an emerging understanding of how the international system affects national policy making, however, it is not clear if current theories consider the differences between international and domestic bureaucracies. This precis picks up on the Organizational Behavioural Model and checks how well it fits the inner workings of international organizations.
The Organizational Behaviour Model (Allison and Zelikow, 1999) was developed as a counter to the tendency for governments to be seen as ‘rational actors’ with behavior analogous to individuals, or as monolithic entities with a unified purpose. Instead, the model describes a complicated collection of organizations and sub-organizations, with their own “interests, perspectives, and standard operating procedures.” (Howlett, Ramesh and Perl, 2009) It is through understanding how bureaucracies function that we can understand their decisions. Allison and Zelikow’s classic study of the Cuban missile crisis provides multiple examples of how the dynamics of decision-making and information sharing across and between government bureaucracies shaped the run-up and outcomes of the crisis. Noting the decision by the Soviets to leave the missiles and support equipment exposed in open fields – and to make little to no effort to conceal or hide their presence in Cuba – Allison and Zelikow explain that this was the standard procedure for the Soviet military personnel, who were used to installing missiles within their own territory or zone of influence. It was only when the US revealed their knowledge of the missiles that pressure was created to adapt the standard operating procedures to the Cuban context.
International organizations also work with standard operating procedures, though generally these will be more flexible than in the military. Moreover, in global organizations such as UNDP, UNICEF and WHO, which have offices and programmes in 198 countries and territories, SOPs need to adapt to regional and national contexts and priorities. The extent of standardization and local adaptation is never fixed; there is a near constant tug-of-war between the efforts to align practices globally and the equally strong imperative to adapt the organization to specific contexts. The result of this tension is different versions of the standard operating procedures across the organization; health policy-making in Latin America by the WHO is substantively different to health policy making in sub-Saharan Africa, which in turn will be different from Eastern and Central Europe, with yet more diversity between countries in a region. This adaptation of procedures, makes decisions like those by the Soviet military in Cuba less likely, though does not remove them entirely.
The multiplicity of sites in which international organizations operate will likely affect not only the operating procedures, but also the actions that the organizations can undertake. In the Organizational Behaviour Model organizations are path-dependent, only able to perform those actions for which organizational capacity exists. Innovation is possible, but generally will only be applied to future situations. (Allison and Zelikow, 1999) International organizations likewise are constrained by existing capacity, but given the range of situations they operate in should have a wider portfolio of capacities to tap into. This should be complimented by learning between countries, which international organizations are well-placed to facilitate. As noted by Romer (2010), learning is sped up when more people have opportunities to interact with each other. International organizations, by virtue of working in and with countries around the world, have the potential to be both fast learners and facilitators of faster learning.
Another key difference between international and national bureaucracies is the relationships with government leaders. In national bureaucracies, there is a clear hierarchy, in which a government sits atop the organizations and can intervene to affect their operations. This control is necessarily limited and usually cannot be sustained over the long-term. Governments tend to rely upon” fixing targets and enacting constraints”, which are often difficult to implement, particularly for organizations with outputs that are not easily observed or quantified. (Allison and Zelikow, 1999) International organizations face the same pressures to meet performance criteria, for example by reducing Infant Mortality Rates, but from a much wider range of governments. International organizations are accountable to their boards, which are composed of United Nations member countries, and to their main donors, often the countries in the G20. However, excessive intervention by any one government is generally not tolerated. The multiplicity of governments sitting atop international bureaucracies invariably dilutes control; at the same time, the need to sustain funding creates pressures to meet wealthier government’s expectations. Presumably the degree of pressure will be determined by the organizations’ ability to demonstrate results that appeal to a wide range of countries and to mobilize resources from a range of sources. For national bureaucracies the latter option, to diffuse control by diversifying funding sources, is not an option.
This quick review of the Organizational Behaviour Model and its applicability to the bureaucracies of international organizations shows that the basic tenets of the model are relevant but need to be substantively revisited. Two key dimensions of difference emerge; 1) international organizations operate in a multiplicity of countries and situations which should improve their ability to adapt actions and operating procedures, along with their capacity to learn, and 2) international organizations are governed by a multiplicity of governments, which dilutes control, but creates pressures to mobilize resources. Potentially, the adaptability of international organizations could be tested by comparing programs and SOPs of those with extensive field operations to those who have less field presence, to see if the frequency and extent of adaptation differs. Likewise, the control and pressures can also be contrasted between organizations with a range of funding sources and less well-funded international organizations to see how this interacts with their policy-making capacity.
October 24, 2016
Government bureaucracies have been identified as key actors within policy making. Ostensibly created to assist political executives to perform tasks entrusted to government, given the size and complexity of these responsibilities, bureaucracies have come to exert their own considerable influence on policy decisions. The scope, scale and shape of this influence are the subject of public policy theory and models – which are grounded in an understanding of domestic or single-country bureaucracies. At the same time, the international system is seen to be playing an increasingly important role in domestic policy-making. (Howlett, Ramesh and Perl, 2009) A wide range of international organizations, from the United Nations programmes and agencies to the Bretton Woods institutions, exert influence on a wide range of policies, from finance to fisheries, from defense to education. There is an emerging understanding of how the international system affects national policy making, however, it is not clear if current theories consider the differences between international and domestic bureaucracies. This precis picks up on the Organizational Behavioural Model and checks how well it fits the inner workings of international organizations.
The Organizational Behaviour Model (Allison and Zelikow, 1999) was developed as a counter to the tendency for governments to be seen as ‘rational actors’ with behavior analogous to individuals, or as monolithic entities with a unified purpose. Instead, the model describes a complicated collection of organizations and sub-organizations, with their own “interests, perspectives, and standard operating procedures.” (Howlett, Ramesh and Perl, 2009) It is through understanding how bureaucracies function that we can understand their decisions. Allison and Zelikow’s classic study of the Cuban missile crisis provides multiple examples of how the dynamics of decision-making and information sharing across and between government bureaucracies shaped the run-up and outcomes of the crisis. Noting the decision by the Soviets to leave the missiles and support equipment exposed in open fields – and to make little to no effort to conceal or hide their presence in Cuba – Allison and Zelikow explain that this was the standard procedure for the Soviet military personnel, who were used to installing missiles within their own territory or zone of influence. It was only when the US revealed their knowledge of the missiles that pressure was created to adapt the standard operating procedures to the Cuban context.
International organizations also work with standard operating procedures, though generally these will be more flexible than in the military. Moreover, in global organizations such as UNDP, UNICEF and WHO, which have offices and programmes in 198 countries and territories, SOPs need to adapt to regional and national contexts and priorities. The extent of standardization and local adaptation is never fixed; there is a near constant tug-of-war between the efforts to align practices globally and the equally strong imperative to adapt the organization to specific contexts. The result of this tension is different versions of the standard operating procedures across the organization; health policy-making in Latin America by the WHO is substantively different to health policy making in sub-Saharan Africa, which in turn will be different from Eastern and Central Europe, with yet more diversity between countries in a region. This adaptation of procedures, makes decisions like those by the Soviet military in Cuba less likely, though does not remove them entirely.
The multiplicity of sites in which international organizations operate will likely affect not only the operating procedures, but also the actions that the organizations can undertake. In the Organizational Behaviour Model organizations are path-dependent, only able to perform those actions for which organizational capacity exists. Innovation is possible, but generally will only be applied to future situations. (Allison and Zelikow, 1999) International organizations likewise are constrained by existing capacity, but given the range of situations they operate in should have a wider portfolio of capacities to tap into. This should be complimented by learning between countries, which international organizations are well-placed to facilitate. As noted by Romer (2010), learning is sped up when more people have opportunities to interact with each other. International organizations, by virtue of working in and with countries around the world, have the potential to be both fast learners and facilitators of faster learning.
Another key difference between international and national bureaucracies is the relationships with government leaders. In national bureaucracies, there is a clear hierarchy, in which a government sits atop the organizations and can intervene to affect their operations. This control is necessarily limited and usually cannot be sustained over the long-term. Governments tend to rely upon” fixing targets and enacting constraints”, which are often difficult to implement, particularly for organizations with outputs that are not easily observed or quantified. (Allison and Zelikow, 1999) International organizations face the same pressures to meet performance criteria, for example by reducing Infant Mortality Rates, but from a much wider range of governments. International organizations are accountable to their boards, which are composed of United Nations member countries, and to their main donors, often the countries in the G20. However, excessive intervention by any one government is generally not tolerated. The multiplicity of governments sitting atop international bureaucracies invariably dilutes control; at the same time, the need to sustain funding creates pressures to meet wealthier government’s expectations. Presumably the degree of pressure will be determined by the organizations’ ability to demonstrate results that appeal to a wide range of countries and to mobilize resources from a range of sources. For national bureaucracies the latter option, to diffuse control by diversifying funding sources, is not an option.
This quick review of the Organizational Behaviour Model and its applicability to the bureaucracies of international organizations shows that the basic tenets of the model are relevant but need to be substantively revisited. Two key dimensions of difference emerge; 1) international organizations operate in a multiplicity of countries and situations which should improve their ability to adapt actions and operating procedures, along with their capacity to learn, and 2) international organizations are governed by a multiplicity of governments, which dilutes control, but creates pressures to mobilize resources. Potentially, the adaptability of international organizations could be tested by comparing programs and SOPs of those with extensive field operations to those who have less field presence, to see if the frequency and extent of adaptation differs. Likewise, the control and pressures can also be contrasted between organizations with a range of funding sources and less well-funded international organizations to see how this interacts with their policy-making capacity.