By David López García
Howlett, Ramesh, and Perl (2009) contend the existence of policy subsystems, defined as an aggregation of the actors, institutions, and ideologies that directly or indirectly affect a specific policy area. While the theoretical approach of the policy subsystem is compelling, if there a lesson to be learned after a careful revision of this week’s reading is that the internal components of a policy subsystem don’t sit easily together. There is a constant tension between actors, institutions, and ideologies, taking the form of a dialectic relationship in which each component shapes and it’s shaped by one another. Furthermore, the examples set forward by the authors show that the dialectic’s causal relationship is far from being clear, as different policy situations produce different directions and intensities of the influence that actors, institutions, and ideology exert over each other.
Actors’ beliefs determine the ideology of the policy subsystem, but at the same time existing ideology can shape actors believes. The social construction of target groups theory explained by Schneider, Ingram and DeLeon (2014) show how the allocation of benefits and burdens to target groups in public policy depends, in part, on the target groups’ positive or negative social construction. A positive social construction is when a group is considered as worthy and deserving and contributing to the general welfare. In contrast, a negative social construction is when a group is considered undeserving and being a burden on the general welfare of society (Schneider, et al., 2014). However, the social construction of target groups can change, as “the seeds for altering social constructions can often be found in the unanticipated or unintended consequences of previous policy designs” (Schneider, et al., 2014, p. 124).
The interplay between actors and ideology can shape institutions, but once institutions are at work, there are feedback effects –or feed forward effects– that have an influence over actors and its ideology. Once at work, public policies operate as institutions that have feedback effects on subsequent policies (Mettler and Sorelle, 2014). Schneider et al (2014) hold that policy designs also shape institutions and the broader culture, both through resource and their interpretive effects, which in turn “impact public and elite opinion, the social constructions of target groups, the distribution of political power resources, and even the legitimacy of various knowledge systems” (p. 108).
When policies are being implemented, institutions and actors engage in a process of adaptation to one another, which can lead to unforeseen outcomes. To authors like Romer (2010), the development of new institutional arrangements suffices to make actors behave accordingly to a completely new set of prosperity-inducing rules. To Romer, “the key challenge is to find meta-rules that encourage productive changes in systems of rules (2010, p. 10). This vision is different to that of Allison and Zelikow (1999), who consider bureaucracy to have a preeminent role in policy implementation, adapting institutions to bureaucracy’s organizational dimension. According to the authors, organizations create capabilities to achieve its own purposes that shape the behavior of their individual members and constrain them to achieve whatever is it that they do (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). Thus, governmental behavior in policy implementation is less deliberate choices of individual actors responding to institutions and more the output of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior.
In yet another example of actors’ power in shaping ideology and institutions, Roy (2009) resorts to the case of civil society grassroots organizations to show how actors are shaping policy outcomes through what she calls a new ‘civic governmentality’. This new relationship between civil society, the state, and target groups creates a new conception of the politics of inclusion, which loops back to the social construction of target groups (Schneider et al, 2014) and redefines who and how should new publics be subject to government intervention. As Roy (2009) shows, through their actions civil society is redefining the meaning of citizenship, which in turn influences ideology and institutions.
To sum up, actors, ideology and institutions might form the policy subsystem of specific policy issues, but they don’t sit easily together. As the preceding discussion has tried to show, each element of the policy subsystem will try to influence the others, and at the same time will be influenced by them. If there is a lesson to be learned, is that there is no clear-cut understanding of the ways in which these influence mechanisms operate. Specific policy situations will come with specific ways in which actors, institutions, and ideology will exert influence over one another.
References
Allison, G. & Zelikow, P. (1999) Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban missile crises. Second Edition, Longman.
Howlett, M., Ramesh, M. & Perl, A. (2009) Studying public policy: Policy cycles and policy subsystems, Third Edition, Oxford University Press. (Chapter 3: The policy context).
Mettler, S. & Sorelle, M. (2014) Policy feedback theory. In Paul A. Sabatier and Christopher M. Weible (Eds.) Theories of the Policy Process, third edition, Westview Press.
Romer, P. (2010) Technologies, rules, and progress: The case for charter city. Center for Global Development, Essay.
Roy, A. (2009) Civic Governmentality: The politics of inclusion in Beirut and Mumbai. Antipode, 41(1), pp. 159-179.
Schneider, A., Ingram, H., & DeLeon, P. (2014) Democratic policy design: Social construction of target populations. In Paul A. Sabatier and Christopher M. Weible (eds.) Theories of the Policy Process, Third Edition, Westview Press.
Howlett, Ramesh, and Perl (2009) contend the existence of policy subsystems, defined as an aggregation of the actors, institutions, and ideologies that directly or indirectly affect a specific policy area. While the theoretical approach of the policy subsystem is compelling, if there a lesson to be learned after a careful revision of this week’s reading is that the internal components of a policy subsystem don’t sit easily together. There is a constant tension between actors, institutions, and ideologies, taking the form of a dialectic relationship in which each component shapes and it’s shaped by one another. Furthermore, the examples set forward by the authors show that the dialectic’s causal relationship is far from being clear, as different policy situations produce different directions and intensities of the influence that actors, institutions, and ideology exert over each other.
Actors’ beliefs determine the ideology of the policy subsystem, but at the same time existing ideology can shape actors believes. The social construction of target groups theory explained by Schneider, Ingram and DeLeon (2014) show how the allocation of benefits and burdens to target groups in public policy depends, in part, on the target groups’ positive or negative social construction. A positive social construction is when a group is considered as worthy and deserving and contributing to the general welfare. In contrast, a negative social construction is when a group is considered undeserving and being a burden on the general welfare of society (Schneider, et al., 2014). However, the social construction of target groups can change, as “the seeds for altering social constructions can often be found in the unanticipated or unintended consequences of previous policy designs” (Schneider, et al., 2014, p. 124).
The interplay between actors and ideology can shape institutions, but once institutions are at work, there are feedback effects –or feed forward effects– that have an influence over actors and its ideology. Once at work, public policies operate as institutions that have feedback effects on subsequent policies (Mettler and Sorelle, 2014). Schneider et al (2014) hold that policy designs also shape institutions and the broader culture, both through resource and their interpretive effects, which in turn “impact public and elite opinion, the social constructions of target groups, the distribution of political power resources, and even the legitimacy of various knowledge systems” (p. 108).
When policies are being implemented, institutions and actors engage in a process of adaptation to one another, which can lead to unforeseen outcomes. To authors like Romer (2010), the development of new institutional arrangements suffices to make actors behave accordingly to a completely new set of prosperity-inducing rules. To Romer, “the key challenge is to find meta-rules that encourage productive changes in systems of rules (2010, p. 10). This vision is different to that of Allison and Zelikow (1999), who consider bureaucracy to have a preeminent role in policy implementation, adapting institutions to bureaucracy’s organizational dimension. According to the authors, organizations create capabilities to achieve its own purposes that shape the behavior of their individual members and constrain them to achieve whatever is it that they do (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). Thus, governmental behavior in policy implementation is less deliberate choices of individual actors responding to institutions and more the output of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior.
In yet another example of actors’ power in shaping ideology and institutions, Roy (2009) resorts to the case of civil society grassroots organizations to show how actors are shaping policy outcomes through what she calls a new ‘civic governmentality’. This new relationship between civil society, the state, and target groups creates a new conception of the politics of inclusion, which loops back to the social construction of target groups (Schneider et al, 2014) and redefines who and how should new publics be subject to government intervention. As Roy (2009) shows, through their actions civil society is redefining the meaning of citizenship, which in turn influences ideology and institutions.
To sum up, actors, ideology and institutions might form the policy subsystem of specific policy issues, but they don’t sit easily together. As the preceding discussion has tried to show, each element of the policy subsystem will try to influence the others, and at the same time will be influenced by them. If there is a lesson to be learned, is that there is no clear-cut understanding of the ways in which these influence mechanisms operate. Specific policy situations will come with specific ways in which actors, institutions, and ideology will exert influence over one another.
References
Allison, G. & Zelikow, P. (1999) Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban missile crises. Second Edition, Longman.
Howlett, M., Ramesh, M. & Perl, A. (2009) Studying public policy: Policy cycles and policy subsystems, Third Edition, Oxford University Press. (Chapter 3: The policy context).
Mettler, S. & Sorelle, M. (2014) Policy feedback theory. In Paul A. Sabatier and Christopher M. Weible (Eds.) Theories of the Policy Process, third edition, Westview Press.
Romer, P. (2010) Technologies, rules, and progress: The case for charter city. Center for Global Development, Essay.
Roy, A. (2009) Civic Governmentality: The politics of inclusion in Beirut and Mumbai. Antipode, 41(1), pp. 159-179.
Schneider, A., Ingram, H., & DeLeon, P. (2014) Democratic policy design: Social construction of target populations. In Paul A. Sabatier and Christopher M. Weible (eds.) Theories of the Policy Process, Third Edition, Westview Press.