Xia
Scholar Mina Addo in her precis focuses on the arguments concerning coercion framework of the policy diffusion and utilizes the Medicaid expansion provision included in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) as an example to show how top-down coercive policies play in the United States. In this precis, I, as an international student from China, will introduce some policy cases to show how the theories of policy diffusion can be applied as well as the limitations of the policy diffusion theories in China. Additionally, I will discuss the Special Economic Zones from a Chinese perspective and explain why it is hardly possible for the other countries to achieve the same accomplishment as what China has done.
Two articles of this week study the theories of policy diffusion from different perspectives and examine in both national and international scope. On the one hand, Shipan and Volden conducted their study in U.S. cities and uncovered four robust mechanisms of policy diffusion: “learning from earlier adopters, economic competition among proximate cities, imitation of larger cities and coercion by state governments,” (p 840). They further tested the conditions of these mechanisms and pointed out that larger cities were more capable to learn from others, less susceptible to economic spillovers and less likely to rely on imitation. Weyland, on the other hand, came up with four frameworks to explain policy diffusion by examining the lessons from Latin American Pension Reform from an international perspective. He proposed four frameworks – external pressure, normative imitation approach, rational learning approach, and cognitive heuristic approach, and claimed that the cognitive heuristic approach, with three principle shortcuts – availability, representativeness and anchoring, make it the best explanation for the three main characteristics of diffusion, “namely its geographic clustering, temporal sequences and substantive nature” (p 287).
Shipan and Volden’s mechanisms of policy diffusion fit well to explain the innovation of the Integral Locating System and the diffusion of the policy. The notorious hukou system in China has been an indispensable tool in implementing the Communist party’s political, social and economic objectives since it was originally adopted in 1958. It was designed purposely to regulate population distribution and rural-to-urban migration. In July 2014, the hukou reform was finally put on the national reform agenda. To solve the migrant workers’ hukou problems, Beijing government initially proposed the Integral Locating System which allows migrant workers to get local hukous at the place where they work if they meet certain requirements. mega cities such as Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Beijing have adopted and implemented this policy gradually, other larger cities will be promoted to take the same strategy during 2018-2020 once the successful lessons are obtained. Both learning and imitation mechanisms can be seen during the process of the Integral Locating System. It is the largest cities. The likelihood of a mega city adopting the policy increases when the same policy is adopted broadly by other mega cities. Meanwhile, it is these mega cities that are more likely to learn from others (conditional learning hypothesis), and smaller cities are more likely to imitate the actions of these mega cities.
In Shipan and Volden’s policy diffusion mechanisms, only the size of population was considered as the conditional nature of each mechanism, which is obviously incomplete and contradicts with the facts in the context of China. In my opinion, at least two other conditions are in play to affect these four mechanisms. The first one is that the consequences of the same policy are different to different cities, and the second one relates the city’s own interest/ideology and its role to the nation. Although Integral Locating System mentioned above was first proposed by Beijing, it was Shenzhen first implemented the policy. Meanwhile, the same policy was carried out with different requirements, with Beijing and Shanghai having the strictest rules and conditions. Beijing and Shanghai are the most capable cities to solve the hukou system issues from political, social and economic perspective. But their slow actions and reluctance and strict rules show that they are not sincere to solve the migrant workers’ hukou issue and the corresponding public service problems. In fact, these two cities have come up with other policies for migrant workers to find it more difficult to stay. These two cities believe more migrant workers getting local hukou will overburden their capacity in providing public service and managing the city. In addition, because Beijing and Shanghai serve as the nation’s political and economic center separately, both central government and local governments are not willing take any risk that may lower down the living standard of the current local residents even though the development in these two cities should be largely attribute to migrant workers’ hard work.
The innovation of special economic zones of China (SEZs) can be explained by the combination of external pressure and domestic initiative and normative imitation approach introduced by Weyland. Although China is a socialist state, the Chinese government leader Deng Xiaoping during 1980s realized that China was in the primary stage of socialism, and had to adapt capitalist techniques to thrive first. He introduced the socialist market economy (domestic initiative) and launched a series of economic reforms including the SEZs. Meanwhile, the market-oriented economy dominated most countries in the world, created the external pressure for China to take rapid adoption economic reforms. The normative imitation approach can also explain the innovation of SEZs. China aimed to be included as a WTP founding member since 1986 and finally joined in 2001. The adoption of SEZs shows the state attempt to gain international legitimacy and demonstrate modernity and compliance with international norms.
Zheng summarized the successful experience, major factors for success, and pitfalls of SEZs in China and suggested several lessons that Africa can learn from China’s SEZs experiences. Beyond what Zheng has provided, I would like to add the more points: first, the regional disparity is enlarged because of the SEZs reform; second, among all the major factors for success, the key one lies in the centralized power in government which make it impossible to be duplicated by other countries. Take a close look at the cities or regions selected as SEZs, you will find all of them are either coastal cities and areas or places that are already better developed than most inland regions. What’s worse is that to support the SEZs, the central government would require the other provinces to provide necessary resources freely to these SEZs, which cause enormous damage to those provinces’ economy and capital accumulation. To my understanding, the reason that SEZs can be so successful in China is largely because of the support and sacrifice of other regions, which are still forgotten by the central government.
To sum up, the mechanisms and framework of policy diffusion have been developed to explain the patterns of policy innovation and diffusion and how and under what circumstances policy diffusion happens. The Integral Locating System of China shows the learning and imitation mechanisms of policy diffusion. Not only size of population but the consequences of policy and the city’s role to the nation affect how the mechanisms work. The framework and external pressure and domestic initiative and normative imitation approach explains the innovation of special economic zones of China (SEZs). Very few scholars would mention that one largest disadvantage of SEZs in China is that it aggravates regional disparities with strong centralized power of government in play and make it SEZs in China so successful and unique.
Two articles of this week study the theories of policy diffusion from different perspectives and examine in both national and international scope. On the one hand, Shipan and Volden conducted their study in U.S. cities and uncovered four robust mechanisms of policy diffusion: “learning from earlier adopters, economic competition among proximate cities, imitation of larger cities and coercion by state governments,” (p 840). They further tested the conditions of these mechanisms and pointed out that larger cities were more capable to learn from others, less susceptible to economic spillovers and less likely to rely on imitation. Weyland, on the other hand, came up with four frameworks to explain policy diffusion by examining the lessons from Latin American Pension Reform from an international perspective. He proposed four frameworks – external pressure, normative imitation approach, rational learning approach, and cognitive heuristic approach, and claimed that the cognitive heuristic approach, with three principle shortcuts – availability, representativeness and anchoring, make it the best explanation for the three main characteristics of diffusion, “namely its geographic clustering, temporal sequences and substantive nature” (p 287).
Shipan and Volden’s mechanisms of policy diffusion fit well to explain the innovation of the Integral Locating System and the diffusion of the policy. The notorious hukou system in China has been an indispensable tool in implementing the Communist party’s political, social and economic objectives since it was originally adopted in 1958. It was designed purposely to regulate population distribution and rural-to-urban migration. In July 2014, the hukou reform was finally put on the national reform agenda. To solve the migrant workers’ hukou problems, Beijing government initially proposed the Integral Locating System which allows migrant workers to get local hukous at the place where they work if they meet certain requirements. mega cities such as Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Beijing have adopted and implemented this policy gradually, other larger cities will be promoted to take the same strategy during 2018-2020 once the successful lessons are obtained. Both learning and imitation mechanisms can be seen during the process of the Integral Locating System. It is the largest cities. The likelihood of a mega city adopting the policy increases when the same policy is adopted broadly by other mega cities. Meanwhile, it is these mega cities that are more likely to learn from others (conditional learning hypothesis), and smaller cities are more likely to imitate the actions of these mega cities.
In Shipan and Volden’s policy diffusion mechanisms, only the size of population was considered as the conditional nature of each mechanism, which is obviously incomplete and contradicts with the facts in the context of China. In my opinion, at least two other conditions are in play to affect these four mechanisms. The first one is that the consequences of the same policy are different to different cities, and the second one relates the city’s own interest/ideology and its role to the nation. Although Integral Locating System mentioned above was first proposed by Beijing, it was Shenzhen first implemented the policy. Meanwhile, the same policy was carried out with different requirements, with Beijing and Shanghai having the strictest rules and conditions. Beijing and Shanghai are the most capable cities to solve the hukou system issues from political, social and economic perspective. But their slow actions and reluctance and strict rules show that they are not sincere to solve the migrant workers’ hukou issue and the corresponding public service problems. In fact, these two cities have come up with other policies for migrant workers to find it more difficult to stay. These two cities believe more migrant workers getting local hukou will overburden their capacity in providing public service and managing the city. In addition, because Beijing and Shanghai serve as the nation’s political and economic center separately, both central government and local governments are not willing take any risk that may lower down the living standard of the current local residents even though the development in these two cities should be largely attribute to migrant workers’ hard work.
The innovation of special economic zones of China (SEZs) can be explained by the combination of external pressure and domestic initiative and normative imitation approach introduced by Weyland. Although China is a socialist state, the Chinese government leader Deng Xiaoping during 1980s realized that China was in the primary stage of socialism, and had to adapt capitalist techniques to thrive first. He introduced the socialist market economy (domestic initiative) and launched a series of economic reforms including the SEZs. Meanwhile, the market-oriented economy dominated most countries in the world, created the external pressure for China to take rapid adoption economic reforms. The normative imitation approach can also explain the innovation of SEZs. China aimed to be included as a WTP founding member since 1986 and finally joined in 2001. The adoption of SEZs shows the state attempt to gain international legitimacy and demonstrate modernity and compliance with international norms.
Zheng summarized the successful experience, major factors for success, and pitfalls of SEZs in China and suggested several lessons that Africa can learn from China’s SEZs experiences. Beyond what Zheng has provided, I would like to add the more points: first, the regional disparity is enlarged because of the SEZs reform; second, among all the major factors for success, the key one lies in the centralized power in government which make it impossible to be duplicated by other countries. Take a close look at the cities or regions selected as SEZs, you will find all of them are either coastal cities and areas or places that are already better developed than most inland regions. What’s worse is that to support the SEZs, the central government would require the other provinces to provide necessary resources freely to these SEZs, which cause enormous damage to those provinces’ economy and capital accumulation. To my understanding, the reason that SEZs can be so successful in China is largely because of the support and sacrifice of other regions, which are still forgotten by the central government.
To sum up, the mechanisms and framework of policy diffusion have been developed to explain the patterns of policy innovation and diffusion and how and under what circumstances policy diffusion happens. The Integral Locating System of China shows the learning and imitation mechanisms of policy diffusion. Not only size of population but the consequences of policy and the city’s role to the nation affect how the mechanisms work. The framework and external pressure and domestic initiative and normative imitation approach explains the innovation of special economic zones of China (SEZs). Very few scholars would mention that one largest disadvantage of SEZs in China is that it aggravates regional disparities with strong centralized power of government in play and make it SEZs in China so successful and unique.