Mammotsa Makhene
In her analysis Theories of Policy Diffusion and Learning, Addo highlights coercive government methods of implementing policy change. She uses the recent medical expansion provision in the Affordable Care Act and the use of possible federal funding loss for Medicaid to show the carrot and stick approach that the government used in this policy implementation. Coercion or the carrot and stick approach is not only used by governments, but international organizations, funders and global regulatory bodies to enforce certain policies.
Looking at Special Economic Zones and the disciplines or guidelines provided by the World Trade Organization (WTO) for several developing countries, I will show how coercion is used by not only government but world bodies that often control important funding.
While there are no explicit guidelines regarding SEZs in any unilateral agreements between the WTO and the developing countries they engage with, several incentives that would typically form part of any country’s SEZs strategy or implementation, are stipulated guidelines in various agreements and negotiations regarding certain subsidies (Creskoff & Walkenhorst, 4). Thus strategies or policies implemented by developing countries regarding SEZs may form part of the overall country’s growth strategy, but not always because policy makers thought them to be suitable but because policy makers thought them to be suitable if funding is to be secured.
The above I believe describes the external pressure framework that Weyland highlights. In this framework, similar reforms are adopted in various regions, that do not seem to have anything in common, simultaneously or in rapid succession of each other. External factors such as International Organizations (IOs), promote certain models or policies that they believe are suitable. As many of these organizations are an important source of funding for many developing countries, their approval is integral. Economic globalization has also increased the power held by IOs as they also play a vital role in certifying a country’s standing with the international investment community (269).
In his analysis Global Experiences with Special Economic Zones With a Focus on China and Africa, Zeng explores the success of Chinese SEZs and how African countries can learn from their experience. The article emphasises strategies and policies that worked in the Chinese model and makes certain recommendations for African states not experiencing the same levels of growth with their SEZs. WTO studies done show that countries such as Ghana, Lesotho, Nigeria, Senegal and Tanzania have not had significant growth in terms of investments, exports and employment generation. A weak business environment is given as a possible reason for this failure (8). What he fails to mention in his paper is that similar reforms in dissimilar settings will not yield the same results, as articulated by Wayden. The Chinese government owned a substantial amount of land and had a lot of political power when the country starting implementing SEZs. This is not the case in many African countries who all have diverse histories of colonization and ownership. These countries often do not have the same political power that the Chinese government had. We can therefore not be surprised at the results.
IOs such as the WTO, need to be careful not to try and influence policy in the hopes of replicating success stories without evaluating the context of each country. Caution also needs to be taken not to spend too much time focusing on processes and compliance at the expense of actual economic growth. An example of this can be found in Creskoff and Walkenhorst paper Implications of WTO Disciplines for Special Economic Zones in Developing Countries, published in the World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series. The title of the paper alone has specific connotations of compliance through discipline. The authors map out four steps for developing countries currently not complying with these disciplines. These include, identifying inconsistent measures, reporting of these to the WTO, development of a plan to address this and implementation of that plan (36). Another example of the clear focus on process is explicitly stated by the authors at the start of the article. “Our analysis is concerned exclusively with multilateral law and leaves economic aspects concerning beneficial or adverse effects of such fiscal incentives aside” ( 4).
Coercion in whichever form it comes, the carrot and stick method, external pressures or not so subtle “guidelines” are of no use if the end results do not yield what the coercion was meant to achieve in the first place. When it comes to policy diffusion and implementation, context matters a great deal. What works in China may not work in Senegal or Nigeria. Yes, lessons can be learned and certain practices borrowed, where they make sense, but one size does not fit all, you cannot make orange juice out of cabbage.
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Works Cited
In her analysis Theories of Policy Diffusion and Learning, Addo highlights coercive government methods of implementing policy change. She uses the recent medical expansion provision in the Affordable Care Act and the use of possible federal funding loss for Medicaid to show the carrot and stick approach that the government used in this policy implementation. Coercion or the carrot and stick approach is not only used by governments, but international organizations, funders and global regulatory bodies to enforce certain policies.
Looking at Special Economic Zones and the disciplines or guidelines provided by the World Trade Organization (WTO) for several developing countries, I will show how coercion is used by not only government but world bodies that often control important funding.
While there are no explicit guidelines regarding SEZs in any unilateral agreements between the WTO and the developing countries they engage with, several incentives that would typically form part of any country’s SEZs strategy or implementation, are stipulated guidelines in various agreements and negotiations regarding certain subsidies (Creskoff & Walkenhorst, 4). Thus strategies or policies implemented by developing countries regarding SEZs may form part of the overall country’s growth strategy, but not always because policy makers thought them to be suitable but because policy makers thought them to be suitable if funding is to be secured.
The above I believe describes the external pressure framework that Weyland highlights. In this framework, similar reforms are adopted in various regions, that do not seem to have anything in common, simultaneously or in rapid succession of each other. External factors such as International Organizations (IOs), promote certain models or policies that they believe are suitable. As many of these organizations are an important source of funding for many developing countries, their approval is integral. Economic globalization has also increased the power held by IOs as they also play a vital role in certifying a country’s standing with the international investment community (269).
In his analysis Global Experiences with Special Economic Zones With a Focus on China and Africa, Zeng explores the success of Chinese SEZs and how African countries can learn from their experience. The article emphasises strategies and policies that worked in the Chinese model and makes certain recommendations for African states not experiencing the same levels of growth with their SEZs. WTO studies done show that countries such as Ghana, Lesotho, Nigeria, Senegal and Tanzania have not had significant growth in terms of investments, exports and employment generation. A weak business environment is given as a possible reason for this failure (8). What he fails to mention in his paper is that similar reforms in dissimilar settings will not yield the same results, as articulated by Wayden. The Chinese government owned a substantial amount of land and had a lot of political power when the country starting implementing SEZs. This is not the case in many African countries who all have diverse histories of colonization and ownership. These countries often do not have the same political power that the Chinese government had. We can therefore not be surprised at the results.
IOs such as the WTO, need to be careful not to try and influence policy in the hopes of replicating success stories without evaluating the context of each country. Caution also needs to be taken not to spend too much time focusing on processes and compliance at the expense of actual economic growth. An example of this can be found in Creskoff and Walkenhorst paper Implications of WTO Disciplines for Special Economic Zones in Developing Countries, published in the World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series. The title of the paper alone has specific connotations of compliance through discipline. The authors map out four steps for developing countries currently not complying with these disciplines. These include, identifying inconsistent measures, reporting of these to the WTO, development of a plan to address this and implementation of that plan (36). Another example of the clear focus on process is explicitly stated by the authors at the start of the article. “Our analysis is concerned exclusively with multilateral law and leaves economic aspects concerning beneficial or adverse effects of such fiscal incentives aside” ( 4).
Coercion in whichever form it comes, the carrot and stick method, external pressures or not so subtle “guidelines” are of no use if the end results do not yield what the coercion was meant to achieve in the first place. When it comes to policy diffusion and implementation, context matters a great deal. What works in China may not work in Senegal or Nigeria. Yes, lessons can be learned and certain practices borrowed, where they make sense, but one size does not fit all, you cannot make orange juice out of cabbage.
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Works Cited
- Creskoff, Stephen, and Peter Walkenhorst. "Implications of WTO disciplines for special economic zones in developing countries." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series, Vol (2009).
- Weyland, Kurt, “Theories of Policy Diffusion: Lessons for Latin American Pension Reform,” World Politics, 57(2), 2005.
- Zeng, Douglas Zhihua, “Global Experiences With Special Economic Zones – With a Focus on China and Africa,” The World Bank, 2015.