By Bart
This week’s readings come at a pertinent time as we struggle with the results of the United States’ presidential election, which has brought dismay to many with the selection of a candidate for whom not only has the rhetoric been offensive, but who has proposed policies harmful to a wide range of minority groups. Samantha’s precis examines how ‘bottom-up’ theories of policy implementation can help us to understand the dynamics underlying the reform effort around the common core curriculum. While her case study on the common core highlights the role of street-level bureaucrats in changing policy, I think that examining immigration policy can show how public opinion can vary widely between stages of policy making without actually changing policy. In the case of Trump’s election, and in particular his promises to deport millions of undocumented immigrants, the disconnect between framing and implementation may provide some hope that his policy positions on the issue will not translate to actual actions.
To start, I think it’s useful to apply Wilson’s matrix to the issue of deportation. Although the actual benefits, to the economy or otherwise, of increasing deportation are highly contested and far from proven (and impacts may in fact be the opposite), let’s assume that, at least in terms of public perception, increased deportations will lead to improved economic conditions and reduced crime. This seems to be the primary argument that Trump’s campaign made, linking immigrants to job losses and general violence. The benefits then of deportation are diffused across society, with few, if any, people feeling a direct and personal identifiable benefit. The costs, however, are placed entirely on one minority group. This type of entrepreneurial politics means that the general public has little incentive to mobilize around the policy, while immigrants and the related subsystem of human rights and other groups will be heavily incentivized to organize against such measures. Freeman (2002) has suggested that this dynamic results, in the case of Western liberal democracies, in immigration policies that are consistently more liberal than the views of the general public.
Ellerman (2006) examines what he refers to as the “deportation gap”—the disconnect between laws dictating eligibility for deportation and actual deportations—that exists across advanced democracies, finding that this gap “cannot be accounted for by inadequate legal instruments of control, but rather by the lack of implementation of existing legal provisions.” He finds that public attention to the costs and benefits of deportation varies across the stages of policymaking. During agenda-setting and policy formulation, a focus on benefits dominates, with discussion focusing on public safety, economic costs incurred by allowing immigrants to stay, and national security. Additionally, the portrayal of immigrants is generally of “politically repellent” individuals that play into public fears of immigrants as a danger to public welfare—what Donald Trump’s campaign referred to as “bad hombres.”
However, there’s an important shift that occurs during the implementation stage of deportation policy. Ellerman (2006) argues that because of the demonizing nature of the portrayal of immigrants in the discourse of the policy framing stage of the process, a significant number of deportees have characteristics that do not match such earlier portrayals. As the costs of deporting immigrants, particularly families and small children, becomes apparent, the implementation process begins to offend the public’s sense of justice, and the public discourse of deportation implementation shifts towards appeals to universal values and human dignity. Thus public opinion at earlier stages of the process will likely show support for the principle of immigration control, but that support fails to carry through to the actual specifics of implementing such controls.
However, there is an important contrast here between immigration and deportation policies and the common core case study presented by Samantha. In Samantha’s case study, the failures and public perceptions generated by them in the implementation stage fed back to policymaking and resulted in a change in policy. Ellerman (2006) suggests that the so-called “deportation gap” persists in advanced democracies, meaning that for some reason the negative public perceptions toward actual cases of deportation fail to result in changes in public perceptions during the framing stage of policy around immigration, as the success of Trump’s campaign rhetoric has shown. Why such contradictions in public perception between framing and implementation are self-correcting in some cases, as in education, and persist in others, such as immigration, could be due to a number of factors, including rejection by street-level bureaucrats, as Samantha describes, or related to the the scope and level of impact.
However, the fact that such a gap has persisted, and continues to persist, around immigration policy and deportation gives us reasons to be hopefully that Trump’s actual deportation policies will be at least not as bad as they might sound. For one, this policy historically has had high support in principle but low support in implementation, and so Trump’s administration might recognize this and not even attempt actual policy changes. And second, even if policies are changed to become harsher, the gap in implementation is likely to continue.
Ellermann, Antje (2006) Street-level democracy: How immigration bureaucrats manage public opposition, West European Politics, 29:2, 293-309.
Freeman, Gary P. (2002). ‘Winners and Losers: Politics and the Costs and Benefits of Migration’, in Anthony M. Messina (ed.), West European Immigration and Immigrant Policy in the New Century. Westport, CT: Praeger.
This week’s readings come at a pertinent time as we struggle with the results of the United States’ presidential election, which has brought dismay to many with the selection of a candidate for whom not only has the rhetoric been offensive, but who has proposed policies harmful to a wide range of minority groups. Samantha’s precis examines how ‘bottom-up’ theories of policy implementation can help us to understand the dynamics underlying the reform effort around the common core curriculum. While her case study on the common core highlights the role of street-level bureaucrats in changing policy, I think that examining immigration policy can show how public opinion can vary widely between stages of policy making without actually changing policy. In the case of Trump’s election, and in particular his promises to deport millions of undocumented immigrants, the disconnect between framing and implementation may provide some hope that his policy positions on the issue will not translate to actual actions.
To start, I think it’s useful to apply Wilson’s matrix to the issue of deportation. Although the actual benefits, to the economy or otherwise, of increasing deportation are highly contested and far from proven (and impacts may in fact be the opposite), let’s assume that, at least in terms of public perception, increased deportations will lead to improved economic conditions and reduced crime. This seems to be the primary argument that Trump’s campaign made, linking immigrants to job losses and general violence. The benefits then of deportation are diffused across society, with few, if any, people feeling a direct and personal identifiable benefit. The costs, however, are placed entirely on one minority group. This type of entrepreneurial politics means that the general public has little incentive to mobilize around the policy, while immigrants and the related subsystem of human rights and other groups will be heavily incentivized to organize against such measures. Freeman (2002) has suggested that this dynamic results, in the case of Western liberal democracies, in immigration policies that are consistently more liberal than the views of the general public.
Ellerman (2006) examines what he refers to as the “deportation gap”—the disconnect between laws dictating eligibility for deportation and actual deportations—that exists across advanced democracies, finding that this gap “cannot be accounted for by inadequate legal instruments of control, but rather by the lack of implementation of existing legal provisions.” He finds that public attention to the costs and benefits of deportation varies across the stages of policymaking. During agenda-setting and policy formulation, a focus on benefits dominates, with discussion focusing on public safety, economic costs incurred by allowing immigrants to stay, and national security. Additionally, the portrayal of immigrants is generally of “politically repellent” individuals that play into public fears of immigrants as a danger to public welfare—what Donald Trump’s campaign referred to as “bad hombres.”
However, there’s an important shift that occurs during the implementation stage of deportation policy. Ellerman (2006) argues that because of the demonizing nature of the portrayal of immigrants in the discourse of the policy framing stage of the process, a significant number of deportees have characteristics that do not match such earlier portrayals. As the costs of deporting immigrants, particularly families and small children, becomes apparent, the implementation process begins to offend the public’s sense of justice, and the public discourse of deportation implementation shifts towards appeals to universal values and human dignity. Thus public opinion at earlier stages of the process will likely show support for the principle of immigration control, but that support fails to carry through to the actual specifics of implementing such controls.
However, there is an important contrast here between immigration and deportation policies and the common core case study presented by Samantha. In Samantha’s case study, the failures and public perceptions generated by them in the implementation stage fed back to policymaking and resulted in a change in policy. Ellerman (2006) suggests that the so-called “deportation gap” persists in advanced democracies, meaning that for some reason the negative public perceptions toward actual cases of deportation fail to result in changes in public perceptions during the framing stage of policy around immigration, as the success of Trump’s campaign rhetoric has shown. Why such contradictions in public perception between framing and implementation are self-correcting in some cases, as in education, and persist in others, such as immigration, could be due to a number of factors, including rejection by street-level bureaucrats, as Samantha describes, or related to the the scope and level of impact.
However, the fact that such a gap has persisted, and continues to persist, around immigration policy and deportation gives us reasons to be hopefully that Trump’s actual deportation policies will be at least not as bad as they might sound. For one, this policy historically has had high support in principle but low support in implementation, and so Trump’s administration might recognize this and not even attempt actual policy changes. And second, even if policies are changed to become harsher, the gap in implementation is likely to continue.
Ellermann, Antje (2006) Street-level democracy: How immigration bureaucrats manage public opposition, West European Politics, 29:2, 293-309.
Freeman, Gary P. (2002). ‘Winners and Losers: Politics and the Costs and Benefits of Migration’, in Anthony M. Messina (ed.), West European Immigration and Immigrant Policy in the New Century. Westport, CT: Praeger.