By Samantha Cocco-Klein
In this week’s lead precis, David López Garcia looks at the Occupy movements in Madrid and New York, arguing that they successfully overcame ‘collective action problems’, while the same time, questioning whether the social movements achieved any influence on policy. In response, this precis examines the Occupy Sandy movement which formed in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy to provide relief and assistance to affected neighborhoods. Reflecting on theories of social movements, this precis will consider Occupation Sandy’s short-lived success in coordinating emergency relief, but its failure to substantively address the structural inequities of recovery and reconstruction. Are ‘collective action problems’ to blame for the movement’s long-term ineffectiveness- or do other theories of provide a better way to understand the dynamics of the Occupy Sandy movement?
Occupy Sandy was a spontaneous relief effort initiated by veterans of the Occupy Wall Street. Using networks and methods established during earlier occupations and protests, Occupy Sandy successfully mobilized volunteers from across New York City to work with community-based organizations in providing mutual aid. In doing so they highlighted shortcomings in the official response and raised awareness of the considerable social and economic disparities in the city’s recovery. [i] In the early days of the emergency, FEMA and other emergency responders found their work being coordinated by Occupy Sandy. The movement’s vibrancy, however, was short-lived. By early December, enthusiasm was already flagging, with an Occupy Sandy volunteer noting “Compared to just a week or two ago, there are now fewer volunteers, fewer people reading the mass emails from Occupy Sandy, fewer hubs in active service.”[ii]
This waning in enthusiasm came despite recognition within the movement that recovery and reconstruction were a critical time for addressing inequities in power and income, themes more central to the broader Occupy movement than emergency relief. Occupy Sandy literature flagged the menace posed by ‘disaster capitalists’ and highlighted the fact that FEMA’s recovery assistance was directed towards home-owners, thus excluding the majority of urban poor, and loan-based, transforming support into a long-term economic liability.[iii] A core group of Occupy Sandy volunteers continued to work on issues of equitable recovery, but by the two year anniversary, the group concluded their online activity. At this point, reconstruction was still far from concluded; NYC’s Build it Back program was in disarray, with rebuilding of houses completely stalled and survivors still in temporary housing[iv], and it would be another year before FEMA would agree to fund a comprehensive recovery and resiliency plan for public housing.
Why did the Occupy Sandy movement fail to effectively engage on issues of long-term recovery and reconstruction? A simple explanation relates to disaster response; during the immediate aftermath of a disaster there is a surge in altruism and cooperation. This wanes once the immediate threat is over and a degree of normal functions are restored.[v] In the case of Occupy Sandy, once the immediate crisis had passed, it can be assumed that it was difficult to sustain the commitment of volunteers that fueled the initial emergency relief. Another simple explanation is provided by Mancur Olson’s ‘logic of collective action’ (1965), which posits that group efforts to meet the common interest or provide public goods invariably ride into the ‘free rider’ problem. Rational, self-interested individuals will avoid the costs (time and money) of contributing to collective action on the assumption that others will be able to contribute to these costs. Assuming that most of the initial Occupy Sandy volunteers were not directly impacted by the storm, their benefit from the collective action was missing to begin with. And while many well-meaning New Yorkers would like to see an equitable storm recovery and reconstruction for others, Olson’s theory posits that they would ‘free-ride’ on the commitment of others to see that the necessary social action occurs.
There has been considerable criticism of Olson’s theory with its assumption of rational, self-interest as the foundation for understanding collective action and social movements. Ostrom’s work has shown that people will voluntarily contribute to the collective good when they have trusts that others will as well – and the sustained commitment to social action by groups around the world is evidence that ideals and morals do indeed motivate activists. (Keck & Sikkink, 1999) A better developed explanation can be found in the Movement Infrastructure Model developed by Kenneth Andrews (2012), which notes that a movement’s longevity and effectiveness is determined by its i) leadership, ii) organizational structure and iii) resources, both financial and human. The strongest leadership is multi-layered and diverse, and movements that are able to persist over the long-term tend to have pre-existing organizational structures. In addition, resources, both human and financial, will contribute to the tactics that movements can use. Social movements that rely on people power will be limited to protests and insurgency, but over the long-term, effectiveness in influencing policy requires a diverse set of tactics, including persuasion and mobilizing the sympathy of elites.
The Occupy Sandy movement, by its very nature, did not have an established organization and multi-layered leadership, which likely contributed to the short-lived nature of the movement. Without a committed leadership to coordinate and structure at community level, sustaining the movement would be difficult, particularly after initial concerns over storm pass. While the movement did foster connections with a network of community-based organizations, a lack of resources meant that the movement had to rely on a limited range of tactics, such as protests and information-sharing, limiting its effectiveness in influencing policy. Other organizations, with deeper roots in the communities – or with greater access and influence, were better positioned for the daunting task of tracking reconstruction policy and financing by Federal agencies, State and City governments, and mounting a coordinated response.
As a spontaneous social movement, it is not clear how long Occupy Sandy was intended to last - or what changes and influence were intended. As noted by Saskia Sassen, the purpose of the Occupy movements is not to attain power but instead is a work of citizenship “exposing deep flaws and wrongs in their polity and society.” This approach steps away from policy decision-making – and instead posits advocacy around agenda setting, awareness and norms. Occupy Sandy was effective in highlighting the unequal impacts of the storm and recovery. But at the same time, this approach presumes that other political organizations, be it social movements, academia, or political parties will carry forward the work of influencing actual policy development and implementation, leaving an unclear legacy for the Occupy movements.
[i] Fueuer, A., Occupy Sandy: A Movement Moves to Relief, The New York Times, November 9, 2012 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/11/nyregion/where-fema-fell-short-occupy-sandy-was-there.html
[ii] Moran, Yotam, The best response to disaster: Go on the offensive, Waging Non-Violence, December 3, 2012 http://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/the-best-response-to-disaster-go-on-the-offensive/
[iii] Strike Debt, Shouldering the Costs: Who Pays in the Aftermath of Hurricane Sandy?, Strike Debt, December 10, 2012
[iv] Buettner, R. and Chen, D., Hurricane Sandy Recovery Program in New York City Was Mired by Its Design
Broken Pledges and Bottlenecks Hurt Mayor Bloomberg's Build It Back Effort, The New York Times, September 4, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/nyregion/after-hurricane-sandy-a-rebuilding-program-is-hindered-by-its-own-construction.html
[v] Hass, J.E., Kates, R. W., and Bowden, M.J., Reconstruction after Disaster, The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1977
In this week’s lead precis, David López Garcia looks at the Occupy movements in Madrid and New York, arguing that they successfully overcame ‘collective action problems’, while the same time, questioning whether the social movements achieved any influence on policy. In response, this precis examines the Occupy Sandy movement which formed in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy to provide relief and assistance to affected neighborhoods. Reflecting on theories of social movements, this precis will consider Occupation Sandy’s short-lived success in coordinating emergency relief, but its failure to substantively address the structural inequities of recovery and reconstruction. Are ‘collective action problems’ to blame for the movement’s long-term ineffectiveness- or do other theories of provide a better way to understand the dynamics of the Occupy Sandy movement?
Occupy Sandy was a spontaneous relief effort initiated by veterans of the Occupy Wall Street. Using networks and methods established during earlier occupations and protests, Occupy Sandy successfully mobilized volunteers from across New York City to work with community-based organizations in providing mutual aid. In doing so they highlighted shortcomings in the official response and raised awareness of the considerable social and economic disparities in the city’s recovery. [i] In the early days of the emergency, FEMA and other emergency responders found their work being coordinated by Occupy Sandy. The movement’s vibrancy, however, was short-lived. By early December, enthusiasm was already flagging, with an Occupy Sandy volunteer noting “Compared to just a week or two ago, there are now fewer volunteers, fewer people reading the mass emails from Occupy Sandy, fewer hubs in active service.”[ii]
This waning in enthusiasm came despite recognition within the movement that recovery and reconstruction were a critical time for addressing inequities in power and income, themes more central to the broader Occupy movement than emergency relief. Occupy Sandy literature flagged the menace posed by ‘disaster capitalists’ and highlighted the fact that FEMA’s recovery assistance was directed towards home-owners, thus excluding the majority of urban poor, and loan-based, transforming support into a long-term economic liability.[iii] A core group of Occupy Sandy volunteers continued to work on issues of equitable recovery, but by the two year anniversary, the group concluded their online activity. At this point, reconstruction was still far from concluded; NYC’s Build it Back program was in disarray, with rebuilding of houses completely stalled and survivors still in temporary housing[iv], and it would be another year before FEMA would agree to fund a comprehensive recovery and resiliency plan for public housing.
Why did the Occupy Sandy movement fail to effectively engage on issues of long-term recovery and reconstruction? A simple explanation relates to disaster response; during the immediate aftermath of a disaster there is a surge in altruism and cooperation. This wanes once the immediate threat is over and a degree of normal functions are restored.[v] In the case of Occupy Sandy, once the immediate crisis had passed, it can be assumed that it was difficult to sustain the commitment of volunteers that fueled the initial emergency relief. Another simple explanation is provided by Mancur Olson’s ‘logic of collective action’ (1965), which posits that group efforts to meet the common interest or provide public goods invariably ride into the ‘free rider’ problem. Rational, self-interested individuals will avoid the costs (time and money) of contributing to collective action on the assumption that others will be able to contribute to these costs. Assuming that most of the initial Occupy Sandy volunteers were not directly impacted by the storm, their benefit from the collective action was missing to begin with. And while many well-meaning New Yorkers would like to see an equitable storm recovery and reconstruction for others, Olson’s theory posits that they would ‘free-ride’ on the commitment of others to see that the necessary social action occurs.
There has been considerable criticism of Olson’s theory with its assumption of rational, self-interest as the foundation for understanding collective action and social movements. Ostrom’s work has shown that people will voluntarily contribute to the collective good when they have trusts that others will as well – and the sustained commitment to social action by groups around the world is evidence that ideals and morals do indeed motivate activists. (Keck & Sikkink, 1999) A better developed explanation can be found in the Movement Infrastructure Model developed by Kenneth Andrews (2012), which notes that a movement’s longevity and effectiveness is determined by its i) leadership, ii) organizational structure and iii) resources, both financial and human. The strongest leadership is multi-layered and diverse, and movements that are able to persist over the long-term tend to have pre-existing organizational structures. In addition, resources, both human and financial, will contribute to the tactics that movements can use. Social movements that rely on people power will be limited to protests and insurgency, but over the long-term, effectiveness in influencing policy requires a diverse set of tactics, including persuasion and mobilizing the sympathy of elites.
The Occupy Sandy movement, by its very nature, did not have an established organization and multi-layered leadership, which likely contributed to the short-lived nature of the movement. Without a committed leadership to coordinate and structure at community level, sustaining the movement would be difficult, particularly after initial concerns over storm pass. While the movement did foster connections with a network of community-based organizations, a lack of resources meant that the movement had to rely on a limited range of tactics, such as protests and information-sharing, limiting its effectiveness in influencing policy. Other organizations, with deeper roots in the communities – or with greater access and influence, were better positioned for the daunting task of tracking reconstruction policy and financing by Federal agencies, State and City governments, and mounting a coordinated response.
As a spontaneous social movement, it is not clear how long Occupy Sandy was intended to last - or what changes and influence were intended. As noted by Saskia Sassen, the purpose of the Occupy movements is not to attain power but instead is a work of citizenship “exposing deep flaws and wrongs in their polity and society.” This approach steps away from policy decision-making – and instead posits advocacy around agenda setting, awareness and norms. Occupy Sandy was effective in highlighting the unequal impacts of the storm and recovery. But at the same time, this approach presumes that other political organizations, be it social movements, academia, or political parties will carry forward the work of influencing actual policy development and implementation, leaving an unclear legacy for the Occupy movements.
[i] Fueuer, A., Occupy Sandy: A Movement Moves to Relief, The New York Times, November 9, 2012 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/11/nyregion/where-fema-fell-short-occupy-sandy-was-there.html
[ii] Moran, Yotam, The best response to disaster: Go on the offensive, Waging Non-Violence, December 3, 2012 http://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/the-best-response-to-disaster-go-on-the-offensive/
[iii] Strike Debt, Shouldering the Costs: Who Pays in the Aftermath of Hurricane Sandy?, Strike Debt, December 10, 2012
[iv] Buettner, R. and Chen, D., Hurricane Sandy Recovery Program in New York City Was Mired by Its Design
Broken Pledges and Bottlenecks Hurt Mayor Bloomberg's Build It Back Effort, The New York Times, September 4, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/nyregion/after-hurricane-sandy-a-rebuilding-program-is-hindered-by-its-own-construction.html
[v] Hass, J.E., Kates, R. W., and Bowden, M.J., Reconstruction after Disaster, The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1977