By Bart
David’s precis presents a comprehensive synthesis of this week’s readings on social movements and their influence on public policy. David ends his precis by posing several discussion questions—the most important of which I think is: to what extent did the Occupy movements have an influence on policy? I would argue that they had a small, though not insignificant, influence on policy. In contrast, however, I think the events of the past few years have shown that right-wing social movements are both gaining large influences on policy and becoming increasingly international. Literature on social movements, at least in the context of the United States in the period from the 1960s to present, seems to be disproportionately focused on progressive movements, but there is evidence that right wing social movements may be fundamentally different from those on the left in several ways, presenting new challenges and opportunities for policy research.
Occupy Wall Street’s successes were largely in agenda setting. They brought issues of inequality to the forefront of American national media, with the largest concrete policy success arguably being the increase in minimum wage in several cities and states, including Republican-dominated Arkansas, Alaska, Nebraska, and South Dakota. In New York, Bill de Blasio won the mayoral election based on a “tale of two cities” campaign to address income inequality. His achievements so far have been modest—expanded pre-K, ID cards for undocumented immigrants, additional affordable housing, and expanded sick leave—and he leads a task force of mayors interested in addressing inequality in their cities. (Levitin, 2015)
However, with some exceptions at the local level, such as Mayor de Blasio, Occupy failed to have the electoral influence that Burstein and Linton (2002) describe, while right-wing movements have ridden anti-globalization and nationalist sentiments to a wave of electoral successes, including Brexit and the election of Donald Trump. Both of these highlight the strength of the movements behind them in that they succeeded largely without the backing of of the leadership of the Republican or Conservative parties or their political machines.
Unlike the poor people’s movements studied by Piven and Cloward (1977), rightist movements often attract basically ordinary and often middle-class people, rather than the “frustrated, downwardly mobile, and socially marginal” (Blee, 1991). Blee and Creasap (2010) argue that such rightist movements fit awkwardly into the theoretical templates of social movements that have been largely developed based on studies of feminism, the New Left, and civil rights movements, which are based on “claim making by disadvantaged minorities” and are poor models for movements of privileged groups (Blee, 2006).
Rightist movements tend to be known for what they are against, rather for what they support and arise or exist as counter-movements. As such, their rhetoric and tactics are influenced by opposing movements. Turning Point USA, an alt-right organization that has gotten attention recently for publishing a watch list of liberal university professors, features “grassroots activism resources” for college students, framing conservative issues in a rights-based claim-making language similar to that used by minority groups.
Furthermore, Sassen (2012) may well have been premature in her dismal assessment of the future of the nation-state. Based on the emergence of various Occupy demonstrations in the wake of the financial crisis, Sassen claimed that “the cages of the national are now being broken,” citing the “decay of the ‘national project’” and the “increasingly palpable insufficiency of the logic of the nation-state.” Four years later, right-wing social movements have used economic issues to reinvigorate and revive nationalism in the United States, Britain, several countries in Eastern and Central Europe, and possibly France next. Blyth (2016) assessed the current global trend, led largely by right-wing movements, pronouncing that "the era of neoliberalism is over. The era of neonationalism has just begun.”
In a study of right wing movements in Europe, particularly Le Pen’s National Front in France, Rydgren (2005) argues that right wing movements were unable to expand beyond a small base of support through their focus on xenophobia and ethno-nationalism until the innovation of a new “master frame” that combined nationalistic elements with economic populism. Snow and Benford (1992) define a frame as an ‘interpretative schemata that simplifies and condenses the “world out there” by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action within one’s present or past environment’. Collective action frames used by social movements attribute blame for perceived social problems by identifying individuals or groups that are believed to have caused the problem in question. Rydgren (2005) also suggest that people who have lost trust in established parties and politicians are less likely to view situations through traditional socioeconomic frames and more likely to adopt ethnic ones.
In her precis, Cocco-Klein finds that the “Occupy Sandy” movement falls in line with Sassen’s (2012) analysis of “Occupy Wall Street”, which aims not to attain power but rather works toward “exposing deep flaws and wrongs in their polity and society.” Cocco-Klein argues that this approach “presumes that other political organizations, be it social movements, academia, or political parties will carry forward the work of influencing actual policy development.” By focusing entirely on agenda-setting, progressive social movements like Occupy may have created an opportunity for issues of inequality to be co-opted by right wing movements that were able to redirect anger towards liberal elites and immigrants.
References
Blee, K. M., & Creasap, K. A. (2010). Conservative and right-wing movements. Annual Review of Sociology, 36, 269-286.
Blee KM. (1991). Women of the Klan: Racism and Gender in the 1920s. Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press
Blee KM. (2006). Can we learn from racists? Mobilization 11:479–82
Blyth, Mark (2016). “Why Trump’s Victory Was 30 Years in the Making and Why It Won’t Stop Here.” Foreign Affairs
Levitin, Michael (2015). “The Triumph of Occupy Wall Street” The Atlantic.
Rydgren, J. (2005). Is extreme right‐wing populism contagious? Explaining the emergence of a new party family. European Journal of Political Research, 44(3), 413-437.
Snow, D.A. & Benford, R.D. (1992). Master frames and cycles of protest. In A.D. Morris & C.M. Mueller (eds), Frontiers in social movement theory. New Haven, CT:Yale University Press.
David’s precis presents a comprehensive synthesis of this week’s readings on social movements and their influence on public policy. David ends his precis by posing several discussion questions—the most important of which I think is: to what extent did the Occupy movements have an influence on policy? I would argue that they had a small, though not insignificant, influence on policy. In contrast, however, I think the events of the past few years have shown that right-wing social movements are both gaining large influences on policy and becoming increasingly international. Literature on social movements, at least in the context of the United States in the period from the 1960s to present, seems to be disproportionately focused on progressive movements, but there is evidence that right wing social movements may be fundamentally different from those on the left in several ways, presenting new challenges and opportunities for policy research.
Occupy Wall Street’s successes were largely in agenda setting. They brought issues of inequality to the forefront of American national media, with the largest concrete policy success arguably being the increase in minimum wage in several cities and states, including Republican-dominated Arkansas, Alaska, Nebraska, and South Dakota. In New York, Bill de Blasio won the mayoral election based on a “tale of two cities” campaign to address income inequality. His achievements so far have been modest—expanded pre-K, ID cards for undocumented immigrants, additional affordable housing, and expanded sick leave—and he leads a task force of mayors interested in addressing inequality in their cities. (Levitin, 2015)
However, with some exceptions at the local level, such as Mayor de Blasio, Occupy failed to have the electoral influence that Burstein and Linton (2002) describe, while right-wing movements have ridden anti-globalization and nationalist sentiments to a wave of electoral successes, including Brexit and the election of Donald Trump. Both of these highlight the strength of the movements behind them in that they succeeded largely without the backing of of the leadership of the Republican or Conservative parties or their political machines.
Unlike the poor people’s movements studied by Piven and Cloward (1977), rightist movements often attract basically ordinary and often middle-class people, rather than the “frustrated, downwardly mobile, and socially marginal” (Blee, 1991). Blee and Creasap (2010) argue that such rightist movements fit awkwardly into the theoretical templates of social movements that have been largely developed based on studies of feminism, the New Left, and civil rights movements, which are based on “claim making by disadvantaged minorities” and are poor models for movements of privileged groups (Blee, 2006).
Rightist movements tend to be known for what they are against, rather for what they support and arise or exist as counter-movements. As such, their rhetoric and tactics are influenced by opposing movements. Turning Point USA, an alt-right organization that has gotten attention recently for publishing a watch list of liberal university professors, features “grassroots activism resources” for college students, framing conservative issues in a rights-based claim-making language similar to that used by minority groups.
Furthermore, Sassen (2012) may well have been premature in her dismal assessment of the future of the nation-state. Based on the emergence of various Occupy demonstrations in the wake of the financial crisis, Sassen claimed that “the cages of the national are now being broken,” citing the “decay of the ‘national project’” and the “increasingly palpable insufficiency of the logic of the nation-state.” Four years later, right-wing social movements have used economic issues to reinvigorate and revive nationalism in the United States, Britain, several countries in Eastern and Central Europe, and possibly France next. Blyth (2016) assessed the current global trend, led largely by right-wing movements, pronouncing that "the era of neoliberalism is over. The era of neonationalism has just begun.”
In a study of right wing movements in Europe, particularly Le Pen’s National Front in France, Rydgren (2005) argues that right wing movements were unable to expand beyond a small base of support through their focus on xenophobia and ethno-nationalism until the innovation of a new “master frame” that combined nationalistic elements with economic populism. Snow and Benford (1992) define a frame as an ‘interpretative schemata that simplifies and condenses the “world out there” by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action within one’s present or past environment’. Collective action frames used by social movements attribute blame for perceived social problems by identifying individuals or groups that are believed to have caused the problem in question. Rydgren (2005) also suggest that people who have lost trust in established parties and politicians are less likely to view situations through traditional socioeconomic frames and more likely to adopt ethnic ones.
In her precis, Cocco-Klein finds that the “Occupy Sandy” movement falls in line with Sassen’s (2012) analysis of “Occupy Wall Street”, which aims not to attain power but rather works toward “exposing deep flaws and wrongs in their polity and society.” Cocco-Klein argues that this approach “presumes that other political organizations, be it social movements, academia, or political parties will carry forward the work of influencing actual policy development.” By focusing entirely on agenda-setting, progressive social movements like Occupy may have created an opportunity for issues of inequality to be co-opted by right wing movements that were able to redirect anger towards liberal elites and immigrants.
References
Blee, K. M., & Creasap, K. A. (2010). Conservative and right-wing movements. Annual Review of Sociology, 36, 269-286.
Blee KM. (1991). Women of the Klan: Racism and Gender in the 1920s. Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press
Blee KM. (2006). Can we learn from racists? Mobilization 11:479–82
Blyth, Mark (2016). “Why Trump’s Victory Was 30 Years in the Making and Why It Won’t Stop Here.” Foreign Affairs
Levitin, Michael (2015). “The Triumph of Occupy Wall Street” The Atlantic.
Rydgren, J. (2005). Is extreme right‐wing populism contagious? Explaining the emergence of a new party family. European Journal of Political Research, 44(3), 413-437.
Snow, D.A. & Benford, R.D. (1992). Master frames and cycles of protest. In A.D. Morris & C.M. Mueller (eds), Frontiers in social movement theory. New Haven, CT:Yale University Press.