By David López García
This week’s readings are most concerned about how social movements can have an impact on the policy-making process. However, to which extent and how exactly political movements manage to have an influence on the policy process, is far from being settled in the literature. By analyzing the case of the occupy movements in Madrid and New York, I’ll pose some questions regarding the movement’s infrastructure, their strategies to influence policy making, and the extent to which they actually achieved their goals.
Andrews (2001) defines political movements as sustained efforts to challenge the existing power relations by employing “disruptive, non-routine tactics that publicly challenge the distribution and uses of power in the broader society” (p. 72). The goal of political movements is to change political institutions, and they attempt to do that by 1) gaining access to the decision-making process, 2) altering an institution’s priorities, 3) securing favorable policies, 4) ensuring that their preferred policies are implemented, or 5) shifting the distribution of institutional resources to benefit the movement’s constituents (Andrews, 2001). In analyzing the outcomes of political movements, Andrews (2001) suggests that the analyst should reveal the causal argument explaining the political movement’s influence, and the mechanisms through which influence was achieved.
It was OIson (1965) through his seminal work on the problems of collective action who started the discussion on how political organizations mobilize to advance their preferred policy outcomes. To Olson, collective action in social movements is hampered by the ‘free rider’ problem. Even though all the members of a group have a common interest in obtaining collective benefits, there is no common interest in paying the cost of obtaining them. Olson argues that only “a ‘separate’ and ‘selective’ incentive will stimulate a rational individual in a latent group to act in a group-oriented way” (p. 51). Olson holds that selective incentives can be either positive or negative, by either punishing those who refuse to contribute or rewarding those who act in the group interest.
More recent literature takes for granted the collective action conundrum and moves to the discussion of the causal relationships and the mechanisms through which social movements influence policy decision-making. Building on the action-reaction and the access-influence models, Andrews (2001) proposes a ‘movement infrastructure’ model that focuses on the organizational structure, available resources, and leadership of social movements to account for their impact on policy-making. According to the movement infrastructure model, social movements that succeed in influencing policies are those that “have diverse leaders and a complex leadership structure, multiple organizations, informal ties that cross geographic and social boundaries, and a resource base that draws substantially on contributions from their members for both labor and money” (p. 76). These organizational characteristics allow movements to employ multiple mechanisms of influence including disruption, persuasion, and bargaining (Andrews, 2001).
Burstein and Linton (2002) walk away from the organizational explanation and put forward a hypothesis related to the interaction social movements’ activities and electoral competition among elected officials. According to the authors, there is evidence to think that “organizational resources, such as numbers of members or size of budgets, are unlikely to strongly influence policy change” (p. 387). Instead, they find evidence to support the hypothesis that it is the movement’s activities, and not their resources, that can potentially influence policy when they “provide elected officials with information and resources relevant to their prospects for reelection” (p. 387).
The discussion posed by Sassen (2012) on the occupy movement makes room to discuss the influence of social movements in policy-decision making. According to the author, the occupy movements around the world and its reclamation of public space aimed at remaking the social and the political by those lacking access to institutionalized political space. In the case of the M15 movement in the Plaza de Mayo in Madrid, the movement started as a one-time protest against the rampant unemployment, the privileges and scandals of corruption of the political class, and a deep dissatisfaction with a dysfunctional democracy stocked in a bipartisan system (De Vicente, 2012). To this point, the strategy of the social movement resembles the action-reaction model described by Andrews (2001), in which movements are dramatic, disruptive and threatening to political elites, having an impact on public opinion that will trigger a rapid response by the government. It is also in line with Burstein and Linton’s (2002) hypothesis in the sense that the protest could threaten the permanence of elected officials, thus triggering a concession to their demands.
However, the M15 movement started as such when a group of people decided to stay permanently in Plaza de Mayo, “reclaiming public space, rearranging it, reshaping it so that it would become a laboratory for discussion and participation” (De Vicente, 2012, p. 225). According to De Vicente (2012), the success of the M15 movement was framing their activity not as a protest, but as a transformation of public space. This explanation resonates with Keck and Sikkink’s (1999) claim that social movements engage in ‘venue shopping’ by framing problems in innovative ways and seeking hospitable venues that help them transform other actor’s views.
In the case of the Occupy Wall Street movement in Zuccotti Park, the objective was to protest against economic and social inequality and the economic privileges of the wealthiest 1% of the US population. “Protesters transformed an otherwise passive and mundane urban space into a site of active political expression and collective actions” (Hou, 2012, p. 92). In addition to campaigning out and putting up protest signs, Hou holds that occupiers also transformed public space by setting up temporary libraries, collecting and preparing food, engaging in conversations with passersby, and participating in shared decision making. Franck and Huang (2012) account for the improvised infrastructure that the movement had to build in order to occupy the space and keep the movement going –staffed information desks, an area with tents for sleeping with designated pathways, a kitchen area, a sanitation committee, and improvised restrooms.
What the cases of the M15 movement and Occupy Wall Street let us see is a reconciliation of the theoretical approaches on how political movements try to have an influence on the policy process. Clearly, both movements succeeded in overcoming the collective action problems. In addition, they used a combination of both innovative activities and movement’s infrastructures to pursue their objectives. To what extent did the occupy movements achieve their intended goals is still an ongoing debate.
Discussion questions:
References
Andrews, K.T. (2001) Social movements and policy implementation: The Mississippi civil rights movement and the war on poverty, 1965 to 1971. American Sociological Review, 66(1), pp. 71-95.
Burstein, P. & Linton A. (2002) The impact of political parties, interest groups, and social movement organizations on public policy: Some recent evidence and theoretical concerns. Social Forces, 81(2), pp. 381-408.
De Vicente, J. L. (2012) Take square: On the hybrid infrastructures of the #15M Movement. In Offenhuber, D. and Schechtner, K. (Eds.) Inscribing a Square: Urban Data as Public Space. Springer, pp. 41-47.
Franck, K. A. & Huang, T. S. (2012) Occupying public space, 2011: from Tahir Square to Zuccotti Park. In Shiffman, R. et. al. (Eds.) Beyond Zuccotti Park: freedom of assembly and the occupation of public space, pp. 3-19.
Hou, J. (2012) Making public, beyond public space. In: Shiffman, R. et. al. (Eds.) Beyond Zuccotti Park: freedom of assembly and the occupation of public space. New Village Press, pp. 89-98.
Keck, M.E. & Sikkink K. (1999) Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics. International Social Sciences Journal, 51(159), pp. 89-101.
Sassen, S. (2012) Occupying is not the same as demonstrating. Committee on Global Thought, Columbia University.
This week’s readings are most concerned about how social movements can have an impact on the policy-making process. However, to which extent and how exactly political movements manage to have an influence on the policy process, is far from being settled in the literature. By analyzing the case of the occupy movements in Madrid and New York, I’ll pose some questions regarding the movement’s infrastructure, their strategies to influence policy making, and the extent to which they actually achieved their goals.
Andrews (2001) defines political movements as sustained efforts to challenge the existing power relations by employing “disruptive, non-routine tactics that publicly challenge the distribution and uses of power in the broader society” (p. 72). The goal of political movements is to change political institutions, and they attempt to do that by 1) gaining access to the decision-making process, 2) altering an institution’s priorities, 3) securing favorable policies, 4) ensuring that their preferred policies are implemented, or 5) shifting the distribution of institutional resources to benefit the movement’s constituents (Andrews, 2001). In analyzing the outcomes of political movements, Andrews (2001) suggests that the analyst should reveal the causal argument explaining the political movement’s influence, and the mechanisms through which influence was achieved.
It was OIson (1965) through his seminal work on the problems of collective action who started the discussion on how political organizations mobilize to advance their preferred policy outcomes. To Olson, collective action in social movements is hampered by the ‘free rider’ problem. Even though all the members of a group have a common interest in obtaining collective benefits, there is no common interest in paying the cost of obtaining them. Olson argues that only “a ‘separate’ and ‘selective’ incentive will stimulate a rational individual in a latent group to act in a group-oriented way” (p. 51). Olson holds that selective incentives can be either positive or negative, by either punishing those who refuse to contribute or rewarding those who act in the group interest.
More recent literature takes for granted the collective action conundrum and moves to the discussion of the causal relationships and the mechanisms through which social movements influence policy decision-making. Building on the action-reaction and the access-influence models, Andrews (2001) proposes a ‘movement infrastructure’ model that focuses on the organizational structure, available resources, and leadership of social movements to account for their impact on policy-making. According to the movement infrastructure model, social movements that succeed in influencing policies are those that “have diverse leaders and a complex leadership structure, multiple organizations, informal ties that cross geographic and social boundaries, and a resource base that draws substantially on contributions from their members for both labor and money” (p. 76). These organizational characteristics allow movements to employ multiple mechanisms of influence including disruption, persuasion, and bargaining (Andrews, 2001).
Burstein and Linton (2002) walk away from the organizational explanation and put forward a hypothesis related to the interaction social movements’ activities and electoral competition among elected officials. According to the authors, there is evidence to think that “organizational resources, such as numbers of members or size of budgets, are unlikely to strongly influence policy change” (p. 387). Instead, they find evidence to support the hypothesis that it is the movement’s activities, and not their resources, that can potentially influence policy when they “provide elected officials with information and resources relevant to their prospects for reelection” (p. 387).
The discussion posed by Sassen (2012) on the occupy movement makes room to discuss the influence of social movements in policy-decision making. According to the author, the occupy movements around the world and its reclamation of public space aimed at remaking the social and the political by those lacking access to institutionalized political space. In the case of the M15 movement in the Plaza de Mayo in Madrid, the movement started as a one-time protest against the rampant unemployment, the privileges and scandals of corruption of the political class, and a deep dissatisfaction with a dysfunctional democracy stocked in a bipartisan system (De Vicente, 2012). To this point, the strategy of the social movement resembles the action-reaction model described by Andrews (2001), in which movements are dramatic, disruptive and threatening to political elites, having an impact on public opinion that will trigger a rapid response by the government. It is also in line with Burstein and Linton’s (2002) hypothesis in the sense that the protest could threaten the permanence of elected officials, thus triggering a concession to their demands.
However, the M15 movement started as such when a group of people decided to stay permanently in Plaza de Mayo, “reclaiming public space, rearranging it, reshaping it so that it would become a laboratory for discussion and participation” (De Vicente, 2012, p. 225). According to De Vicente (2012), the success of the M15 movement was framing their activity not as a protest, but as a transformation of public space. This explanation resonates with Keck and Sikkink’s (1999) claim that social movements engage in ‘venue shopping’ by framing problems in innovative ways and seeking hospitable venues that help them transform other actor’s views.
In the case of the Occupy Wall Street movement in Zuccotti Park, the objective was to protest against economic and social inequality and the economic privileges of the wealthiest 1% of the US population. “Protesters transformed an otherwise passive and mundane urban space into a site of active political expression and collective actions” (Hou, 2012, p. 92). In addition to campaigning out and putting up protest signs, Hou holds that occupiers also transformed public space by setting up temporary libraries, collecting and preparing food, engaging in conversations with passersby, and participating in shared decision making. Franck and Huang (2012) account for the improvised infrastructure that the movement had to build in order to occupy the space and keep the movement going –staffed information desks, an area with tents for sleeping with designated pathways, a kitchen area, a sanitation committee, and improvised restrooms.
What the cases of the M15 movement and Occupy Wall Street let us see is a reconciliation of the theoretical approaches on how political movements try to have an influence on the policy process. Clearly, both movements succeeded in overcoming the collective action problems. In addition, they used a combination of both innovative activities and movement’s infrastructures to pursue their objectives. To what extent did the occupy movements achieve their intended goals is still an ongoing debate.
Discussion questions:
- To which extent and through which specific mechanisms did the occupy movements achieve to influence policy-making, if at all?
- How did the occupy movements overcome the collective action problem?
- What was the ‘movement infrastructure’ of the occupy movements? Did it help or did it hamper the movements’ goals?
- How was the interaction between the occupy movements and both, public opinion and electoral competition? How did these interactions affect the way that the movements influenced policy-making?
- Can the occupy movements be considered a Transnational Advocacy Network? If so, how did it operate to influence policy-making processes?
References
Andrews, K.T. (2001) Social movements and policy implementation: The Mississippi civil rights movement and the war on poverty, 1965 to 1971. American Sociological Review, 66(1), pp. 71-95.
Burstein, P. & Linton A. (2002) The impact of political parties, interest groups, and social movement organizations on public policy: Some recent evidence and theoretical concerns. Social Forces, 81(2), pp. 381-408.
De Vicente, J. L. (2012) Take square: On the hybrid infrastructures of the #15M Movement. In Offenhuber, D. and Schechtner, K. (Eds.) Inscribing a Square: Urban Data as Public Space. Springer, pp. 41-47.
Franck, K. A. & Huang, T. S. (2012) Occupying public space, 2011: from Tahir Square to Zuccotti Park. In Shiffman, R. et. al. (Eds.) Beyond Zuccotti Park: freedom of assembly and the occupation of public space, pp. 3-19.
Hou, J. (2012) Making public, beyond public space. In: Shiffman, R. et. al. (Eds.) Beyond Zuccotti Park: freedom of assembly and the occupation of public space. New Village Press, pp. 89-98.
Keck, M.E. & Sikkink K. (1999) Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics. International Social Sciences Journal, 51(159), pp. 89-101.
Sassen, S. (2012) Occupying is not the same as demonstrating. Committee on Global Thought, Columbia University.